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1. Introduction
The Internet has evolved from being an academic
pursuit to a huge commercial commodity. The
IP thin waist, attributed to the simplicity of the
present design has been a remarkable architectural
choice motivated by the need to converge multi-
ple link layer technologies and end-to-end trans-
port mechanisms. However, the assumptions un-
der which the original Internet was designed have
changed. Newer contexts and specific requiremetns
have subjected the original design paradigms of the
Internet to a lot of abuse. Owing to the limita-
tions of the underlying architecture, such overlaid
hacks have limited effectiveness and are often higly
inefficient.
Commercialization of the Internet has introduced
concerns about security, trust, and value added ser-
vices. Introduction of network-able wireless sys-
tems has forced the paradigm of mobility. Use of
the Internet as a communication commodity driv-
ing the needs of business communications has raised
the need for better resilience and fault-tolerance
through fine grained control and management. Best
effort delivery model of IP is no longer considered
adequate. Routing is no longer based on algorith-
mic optimization but has to deal with policy com-
pliance. Assumptions about persistently connected
end systems do not hold with the introduction of
delay tolerant networking paradigms. Protocols de-
signed without concern for energy efficiency can-
not integrate energy conscious embedded system
networks like sensor networks. Initial projections
about the scale of the Internet have long since been
invalidated leading to a current situation of IP ad-
dress scarcity, BGP table growth etc. Such and
numerous other needs, as a result of wide scale
proliferation and service diversification of the Inter-
net have led to forceful “plumbing-in” of external
architectural artifacts into the core design. Such
plumbing-in is not seamless, marring the simplic-
ity of the IP design and introducing numerous side
effects.
Several of the most relevant and immediate prob-
lems that the current Internet design has failed to
provide a satisfactory solution has been discussed
in [60].
Over the years, networking research has intro-
duced newer protocols and newer architectural de-
signs. However, as already said, the Internet is its
own worst adversary. It has not been possible to in-
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troduce any major changes to the deployed base of
the Internet. Small and incremental changes, solv-
ing the current problems have introduced scores of
others. The myopic view of incremental approaches
has arguably stretched the current design to the
maximum. Beyond this, and to cater to the needs
of the future, the Internet has to be extended. It
has to be redesigned for the present requirements,
at the same time ensuring enough flexibility to ad-
equately incorporate future requirements.
A new paradigm of architectural design thought
of “Clean Slate Design” is being touted against the
more traditional approach of incremental design.
The theme of “Clean Slate” design is to design
the system from scratch without being restrained
by the constraints of the existing deployed system,
providing a chance to have an unbiased look at the
problem space. However, the scale of the current
Internet forbids any changes and it is extremely dif-
ficult to convince the stake-holders to believe in a
clean-slate design and adopt it. There is simply
too much risk involved in the process. The only
way to mitigate such risks and to appeal to stake
holders is through actual Internet-scale validation
of such designs showing their superiority over the
existing systems. Fortunately, the research fund-
ing agencies all over the world have realized this
pressing need and a world-wide effort to develop
the next generation Internet is being carried out
in full throttle. The National Science Foundation
(NSF) was amongst the first to announce a GENI
(Global Environment for Networking Innovations)
program for developing an infrastructure for devel-
oping and testing futuristic networking ideas devel-
oped as part of its FIND (Future Internet Design)
program. The NSF effort was followed suit by the
FIRE (Future Internet Research and Experimen-
tation) program supporting numerous next genera-
tion networking projects under the 7th Framework
Program of the European Union, the AKARI pro-
gram in Japan and several other similar specialized
programs in China, Australia, Korea, and several
other parts of the world.
The scale of the research efforts to develop a next
generation Internet bears proof to the importance
of the Internet and the need for its improvement
to sustain the requirements of the future. However,
the amount of work being done or proposed may
really baffle someone trying to get a comprehensive
view of the major research areas. In this paper, it
is our goal to help fathom the diversity of these re-
search efforts by presenting a coherent model of the
research areas and introducing some of the key re-
search projects in these areas. However, this paper
does not claim to be a comprehensive review of all
the next generation Internet projects but may be
considered as an introductory treatise on the broad
aspects and some related proposed solutions.
Next generation Internet research efforts can be
classified under the primary functions of a net-
working context such as routing, content deliv-
ery, managememt and control, security and so on.
In Section 2 we argue against such an organiza-
tion of the research efforts with the view that this
organization is contrary to the clean-slate design
thought. We present Internet 3.0 as an example of
a truly clean-slate fundamental architectural frame-
work that does not aim at optimizing one particular
function but addresses the holistic issue of network-
ing in the future. We then survey some of the more
progressive and intersting ideas in smaller and more
independent research areas and classify them in var-
ious sections as follows:
1. Security: In the current Internet, security
mechanisms are placed as additional overlay
on top of the original architecture instead of as
part of the Internet architecture, which leads to
a lot of problems. In this section, several new
propositions and on-going research efforts that
address the problems of security from a dif-
ferent perspective are analyzed and discussed.
This includes proposals and projects related
to security policies, trust relationships, names
and identities, cryptography, anti-spam, anti-
attacks, and privacy, etc.
2. Content Delivery Mechanisms: This section
deals with research on new mechanisms for
content delivery over the Internet. The next
generation Internet is set to see a huge growth
in the amount of content delivered over the In-
ternet and requires robust and scalable meth-
ods to prepare for it. Also, newer paradigms
of networking with content delivery as the cen-
tre of the architecture rather than connectivity
between hosts as in the current architecture is
discussed.
3. Delay Tolerant Networking: The original as-
sumption of all routers along the end-to-end
path being up is no longer valid particularly in
environments with extremely long paths. This
has lead to new research in the area of dis-
ruption tolerant and delay tolerant networking
(DTN). This discussion is followed by a discus-
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sion of how some of the ideas of DTN can be
used to make the future Internet energy effi-
cient and to support intermittently connected
mobile hosts.
4. Management and Control Framework: The
current Internet works on a retro-fitted man-
agement and control framework that does
not provide efficient management and trou-
bleshooting. The proposals for the future In-
ternet in this area vary from completely cen-
tralized ideas of management to more scalable
and distributed ideas. The discussions in this
section relate to the issues of management and
control in the current Internet and some of the
proposals for the future.
5. Service Architectures: The commercial usage
of Internet, the ubiquitous and heterogeneous
environments, and security and management
challenges require the next generation Internet
to provide a broad range of services that go far
beyond the simple store-and-forward paradigm
of the today’s Internet. In this section, several
proposals on designing next generation service
architecture are discussed. Key design goals
for next generation service architecture include
flexibility and adaptability, avoiding the os-
sification of the current Internet, and facili-
tating mapping the user-level service require-
ments into the lower infrastructure layers.
6. Routing: This section is mainly dedicated to
novel and futuristic proposals addressing the
routing problem. While some proposals try to
address the immediate concerns with IP based
routing, others are more futuristic and propose
fundamental changes to the routing paradigm.
7. Future Internet Infrastructure Design for Ex-
perimentation: This section discusses the var-
ious efforts to develop testbed architectures
that can support the research needs to next
generation proposals. Two basic ideas are
those of: (1) Virtualization: providing iso-
lation and sharing of substrate experimental
resources including routers, switches and end
hosts, and (2) Federation: providing realistic
and large scale testing environments through
federation of multiple diverse testbeds designed
to represent diverse contexts.
2. Internet 3.0
The Internet 3.0 project at Washington Univer-
sity in Saint Louis is an effort to define a new archi-
tectural basis for the future Internet. Leveraging
years of experience with the current Internet de-
sign and related research efforts to modify/improve
it, Internet 3.0 proposes a multi-tier diversified ar-
chitecture separating hosts, data, services, users
and infrastructure, and establish them as individ-
ual objects such that it allows dynamically compos-
able networking contexts according to specified fine
grained policies and requirements. It deviates from
the existing “one suit fits all” paradigm of the cur-
rent Internet model and introduces a new paradigm
of “requirement specific” networking. Internet 3.0
differs from other clean-slate next-generation Inter-
net proposals in that it takes a holistic view of the
present problems, rather than treating each of them
in isolation.
Clean-slate views of isolated problems in a spe-
cific functional area do not necessarily fit together
to define a seamless integrated system as a whole
since they are defined under fixed assumptions
about the other parts of the system. This result
in the best individual solutions often contradict-
ing each other at the system level. As an exam-
ple, a clean-slate centralized management and con-
trol proposal may interfere with the objectives of a
highly-scalable distributed routing mechanism, ren-
dering both the solutions useless in the system per-
spective. Also, we believe that the current Internet
and its success should not in any way bias “clean
slate” thought and designers should be able to put
in radical new ideas that may have absolutely no
semblance to any design principle of the current In-
ternet.
As already mentioned, Internet 3.0 takes a holis-
tic view of the problem space and defines a “fun-
damental constraint-based diversified environment”
such that a “requirement specific” networking con-
text can be composed dynamically from a set of
fundamental objects subject to some fundamental
constraints. Specific protocols and functions op-
erate within this framework to serve specific net-
working scenarios. The Internet 3.0 fundamental
objects include user, data, services, host and in-
frastructure. The primary fundamental constraint
on these objects can be represented by a simple
dependency diagram representing the implicit de-
pendencies among the various objects.
As shown in Fig. 1, a user, service or data cannot
participate in a networking context without a direct
connection to a network-able electronic host and a
network-able host depends on its connection to the
networking infrastructure, to be able to communi-
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cate. This dependency model is common knowl-
edge and true for any communication environment.
However, the design of the current Internet treats
this layered dependency model as an atomic unit
for communication and defines protocols to achieve
communication between two such entities. More ex-
plicitly, the current Internet is designed to conflate
users, data and services to hosts and hosts to their
particular point-of-presence in the infrastructure.
Internet 3.0 proposes to establish a de-conflated en-
vironment in which each of the fundamental objects
are allowed to exist independently and define mech-
anisms to dynamically compose them to valid net-
working contexts. The scope of this dynamic com-
position should also allow dynamic re-compositions
in case a particular context is rendered invalid at a
certain point within the communication process.
Figure 1: Object Dependency in Internet 3.0
Object independence entails the need for inde-
pendent object naming and for defining manage-
ment and policy enforcement boundaries. PONA
[143] is a sub-project of Internet 3.0 that proposes
a policy oriented naming architecture. PONA pro-
poses logical aggregation of objects under common
trust, security and administrative policies to form
“realms”. Thus, data objects belong to their data
realm, users belong to user realms, hosts belong to
the host realm and so on. Fig 2, which extends the
dependency graph of Fig. 1 presents this idea. The
aggregation enforced by the concept of realms is
purely logical and enforced by special objects called
realm managers.
Objects are named in the context of their spe-
cific realms and each object is allowed to belong
to multiple realms. A networking context com-
posed of objects from various realms is valid only
if they do have a conflict-free policy subset. Also,
the realm managers act as anchor points for ob-
jects and provide services such as (1) object registry
maintaining object capabilities, (2) object negotia-
tion agent for leasing objects for a particular ap-
plication, (3) object authentication, authorization
and accounting functions, (4) trusted delegation
points of objects, (5) home agents for object mo-
bility and so on. These functions resemble the role
of a middle-box in the current Internet, however
unlike middle-boxes, realm managers are legitimate
members defined within the architecture thus allow-
ing enhanced functionality and fine-grained control.
Realms are hierarchical with naming of the realms
representing this hierarchy to allow Internet-scale
deployability.
Figure 2: Organization of Objects in Internet 3.0
PONA lays down the basic organization of ob-
jects. As is obvious from the organization, PONA
enables separate ownership for each object subject
to specific owner-specified policies. The primary
challenge, however, is to form a desired network-
ing context from these objects. Preposterous as it
may seem, it is not far from reality. Ubiquity of the
infrastructure points-of-attachments through huge
advances of wireless broadband technologies lay the
foundation of a future where local processing and
storage shall be seamlessly moved to the Internet
cloud. In such a context, imagine a use case sce-
nario where a user entrusts a host-leasing service
provider with storing his data and provide process-
ing power on behalf of the user when required. At
some point of time, the user may choose to (1) pro-
cess/view his own data locally, or (2) transfer his
local data to be stored in the cloud, (3) delegate
data processing to the cloud, (4) transfer his data
in the cloud to another user also on the cloud, and
so on.
The host-leasing service provider is responsible
for ensuring seamless availability of the users data
notwithstanding his location or state. To guaran-
tee timely availability of data to the user, the host-
leasing provider may resort to special means, such
as, (1) caching parts of data in various locations, (2)
moving bulk data from one storage space location
to another following user movement, (3) transfering
users data to another user from the nearest copy or
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copies, etc. The user should be oblivious to how the
host-leasing provider achieves these functionalities
to meet its service level agreement. The host leas-
ing company may, however, have to depend on dif-
ferentiated services from infrastructure providers.
While infrastructure providers, such as ISP’s, pro-
vide infrastructure objects and guarantees within
their own administrative domains (realm), a path
might need to be composed of multiple such in-
frastructure objects. A infrastructure-leasing ser-
vice provider may provide multi-infrastructure ob-
ject SLA service to the host-leasing service provider
above it. This vertical hierarchy sets up an effective
SLA and billing framework.
In this massively distributed scenario, the com-
position of an effective and valid networking sce-
nario is set up through the collaboration of objects
along the different levels of the dependency dia-
gram hierarchy of Fig. 2. The host leasing ser-
vice and infrastructure leasing service can indepen-
dently define their own mechanism for content de-
livery, distribution, routing, naming etc. However,
some common mechanisms required by these ser-
vices include (1) a specification language through
which the objects could advertise their capabili-
ties, policies, costs, availability etc., (2) a brokerage
mechanism that allows object brokering, and (3) a
management mechanism at each level ensuring de-
livery of services.
The business incentives for current ISP’s to allow
leasing of infrastructure objects lie in the competi-
tive pressure on ISP’s by overlay systems and future
overlay hosting services. However, services such as
those provided by these overlay hosting services is
a subset of the multi-level object composition envi-
ronment discussed here. Also, inefficiency of over-
lay mechanisms owing to duplicacy of effort, (2)
inability of underlays to provide diversified services
owing to their goal of achieving global optimization
of all flows, and (3) policy tussle between overlays
and underlays can be avoided in Internet 3.0. Ad-
ditionaly, Internet 3.0 provides a much more flex-
ible, dynamic, mobile and policy enforceable envi-
ronment for future networking contexts.
The ideas described till now are clean-slate and
futuristic and require significant changes to the cur-
rent Internet architecture. However, progress in
virtualization technologies and ubiquity of the net-
working environment is soon expected to demand
such massive changes of the current Internet. A
more immediately tangible and proof –of-concept
project undertaken to design a more modest archi-
tecture introducing the ideas of host and infrastruc-
ture realm is described in [140], [141] and [185]. The
same concepts could be applied to solve the prob-
lems of host mobility, site multi-homing, routing
scalability and trust-based security in the current
Internet.
MILSA (Mobility and Multihoming supporting
Identifier Locator Split Architecture) is basically
designed to be an end-host based ID locator split
routing architecture. MILSA has three main fea-
tures. First, MILSA separates ID from locator in
the end host side, and also separates trust rela-
tionships (administrative realms) from connectivity
(infrastructure realms). The detailed mechanisms
on how to setup and maintain this trust relation-
ship are presented in [140]. A hierarchical identi-
fier system allows a scalable bridging function that
is placed between the host realms and the infras-
tructure realms. Second, the signaling and data
plane functions are separated to improve the per-
formance and support mobility. Third, to provide
transparency to upper layer applications, identifier
locator split happens at the network layer. A Hi-
erarchical URI-like Identifier (HUI) is used by the
upper layers and is mapped to a set of locators by
the HUI Mapping Sublayer (HMS) through inter-
action with the bridging infrastructure.
In [141], several design enhancements for MILSA
are presented including (1) a security-enabled and
logically oriented hierarchical identifier system, (2)
a three-level identifier resolution system, (3) a new
hierarchical code based design for the locator struc-
ture, (4) cooperative mechanisms among the three
planes in the MILSA model to assist mapping
and routing, and (5) an integrated MILSA service
model. The underlying design rationale is also dis-
cussed along with the design descriptions.
To summarize our work on MILSA and MILSA
enhancements [140] [141] in which the basic MILSA
architectural design and extensions were presented,
1. MILSA [140] is basically an end-host based ID
locator split architecture;
2. It tries to address all the problems identified by
the IRTF RRG design goals (such as: routing
scalability, mobility, multihoming, and traffic
engineering); actually none of the other exist-
ing solutions can address them all;
3. It avoids the Provider Independent (PI) ad-
dresses usage for global routing;
4. It implements signaling and data separation to
improve performance and efficiency;
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5. It introduces a new decoupled ID space that
can facilitate further trust relationship, pro-
vides policy enforcements among different or-
ganizations, and supports location privacy by
proxy;
6. In [141], we presented many enhancements
such as secure hierarchical ID system, multiple
ID resolution and mapping, multicast, many-
cast, and service integration.
The RANGI project [185] uses similar loca-
tor/Identifier split ideas in the context of site multi-
homing and traffic engineering. Site multi-homing
in the current Internet requires the use of provider
independent (PI) addreses which greatly increases
the load on default-free-zone (DFZ) routers. While
PI sites desire this independance of being able to
choose their providers, they negatively impact the
scalability of the routing infrastructure. RANGI is
an effort to preserve the site interests while at the
same time addressing the scalability issue. The pri-
mary idea is to assign (1) multiple provider aggre-
gatable (PA) addresses to each host in the customer
network from upstream provider address blocks,
and (2) a host ID representing the logical organiza-
tional membership of the host to the customer site.
Assigning PA addresses to such stub sites helps the
issue of routing scalability, while sites are allowed to
multi-home by employing IP re-writing techniques
at the border routers. Transport connections are
bound to host IDs and, thus, are not affected by
address re-writing.
The RANGI mechanism is represented in Fig. 3.
As an example, a stub site multi-homing to two
providers, X and Y, receives two distinct PA loca-
tor prefixes or locator domain IDs (LDIDs) from
the two providers. Each host in the stub site is
given a permananet host ID (HID) and two lo-
cators from each PA locator prefix (LDIDX and
LDIDY). The transport layer session is bound to
the host ID (HID) allowing transport sessions to
remain intact across locator changes. Locators in
RANGI have two parts, a local part also called the
local locator (LL) appended to a network PA pre-
fix or LDID. In order to avoid link failures or for
site traffic engineering, the stub site border routers
may re-write the source address of a packet. In
this example, the border router (BR) rewrites the
network prefix of the locator (LDIDX to LDIDY)
keeping the LL intact. This also allows the stub
site to perform ingress traffic engineering for that
particular session. RANGI, thus, motivates sites to
obtain aggregatable PA locators by allowing them
the same amount of flexibility, robustness and avail-
ability that could be achieved with PI locator based
multi-homing solutions.
Figure 3: RANGI: Locator re-writing
RANGI host IDs consist of (1) a hierarchical
part overlayed with a hierarchical administrative
structure representing logical organizational hier-
archy, and (2) a flat part representing a crypto-
graphic hash of the hierarchical part to serve as a
secure identifier. Both host IDs and host locators
are 128-bit long. A hierarchical DHT mechanism
is used to map host IDs to 128-bit IPv6 host lo-
cators. Thus, the RANGI mechanism is compat-
ible to legacy IPv6 applications while also allow-
ing enhanced security, site multi-homing, traffic-
engineering and routing scalability features.
Thus, the Internet 3.0 project with its futuristic
ideas of a highly dynamic networking environment
consisting of dynamically composed objects and its
more modest proof-of-concept design of MILSA and
RANGI combines a clean slate effort with more tan-
gible and immediately deployable incremental tran-
sition path. While Internet 3.0 is unique in this
sense, it is also unique in trying to view the scope
of the problem more holistically than most other
next generation efforts.
3. Security
The original Internet was designed in a trust-
all operating environment of universities and re-
search laboratories. However, this assumption has
long since been invalidated with the commercial-
ization of the Internet. Security has become one
of the most important areas in Internet research.
With more and more businesses getting online and
plethora of new applications finding new uses of
the Internet, security is surely going to be a ma-
jor concern for the next generation. In the next
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generation Internet, security shall be a part of the
architecture rather than being overlaid on top of
the original architecture as in the current Internet.
Years of experience in security research has now
established the fact that security is not a singu-
lar function of any particular layer of the proto-
col stack but is a combined responsibility of every
principal communication function that participates
in the overall communication process. In this sec-
tion, we present several next generation proposals
that address the problem of security from a differ-
ent angle. This includes the security policies, trust
relationships, names, identities, cryptography, anti-
spam, anti-attacks, and privacy, etc.
3.1. Relationship-Oriented Networking
The basic goal of the Relationship-Oriented Net-
working project [3] is to build a network architec-
ture that makes use of secure cryptographic iden-
tities to establish relationship among people, enti-
ties, and organizations in the Internet. It tries to
provide better security, usability, and trust in the
system and allows different users and institutions
to build trust relationships within networks similar
to what happens in the real world.
Relationship-Oriented Networking will mainly:
1. Consider how to pervasively incorporate cryp-
tographic identities into the future network ar-
chitecture.
2. Use these strong identities to establish rela-
tionships as first-class citizens within the ar-
chitecture.
3. Develop an architectural framework and its
constituent components that allow users and
institutions to build trust relationships within
the context of digital communications that can
be viewed and utilized much like relationships
outside the realm of digital communications.
3.1.1. Identities
The traditional Internet uses unique names to
identify various resources. These names can be
email addresses, account names, instant messaging
IDs, etc. For example, we use the email address
“user@organization.com” as the identifier for the
email service. However, these identities offer lit-
tle security since it can be easily spoofed. More-
over, they are invalidated after a change of ser-
vice providers. To solve these problems, in the
Relationship-Oriented Networking, cryptographic
identities are used throughout the architecture.
These identities are more secure than the plain
name-based schemes because it integrates security
features in the form of keys or certificates.
3.1.2. Building and Sharing Relationships
Architecture can permit relationships to be es-
tablished implicitly or explicitly. For sensitive ap-
plications with tight access control such as banking,
the relationship between a bank and a patron and
the patron with their account would need explicit
configuration. In comparison, less sensitive ser-
vices may be able to rely on less formal opportunis-
tic relationships. For example, a public enterprise
printer may need less tight access control and the
relationship may be opportunistic and less formal.
The relationship between people can also be built
implicitly or explicitly. Similar to trust relationship
formations in our society, the relationship can also
be setup by “user introductions”. Also, sharing of a
relationship among different people or entities is al-
lowed which represents some degree of transitivity
of the relationship. Moreover, the relationship can
also be leveraged as a vote of confidence when try-
ing to decide whether an unknown service provider
is legitimate or malicious. Obviously, the sharing of
the relationship should be limited by the potential
downside and privacy implications.
3.1.3. Relationship Applications
Access control is one of the relationship applica-
tions. It spans from low-level access controls on
the physical network infrastructure to high-level
application specific control. The first level of en-
hanced access control comes from having stronger
notions of identity because of the adoption of
cryptographic-based schemes. Thus, access control
can be implemented based on the users or the ac-
tors instead of rough approximations such as MAC
addresses, IP addresses or DNS names. Typical ex-
amples are “Allow employee in human resource de-
partment to access the disk share that holds the
personnel files” and “Allow Bob, Jane and Alice
access to the shared music on my laptop”. These
access control policies offer a number of benefits.
Relationships can also be used for service valida-
tion. In practice, users need to know that they are
communicating with the expected service provider
instead of some malicious attacker. Hence, the rela-
tionship can be used to do this job in several ways.
Relationship oriented networking also tries to
build a naming system that follows the social graph
to an alias resource. The resource with a name can
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also be aliased in a context-sensitive way by the
users. Users can expose their name to the social
networks and this in turn provides ways to share
information. For example, the name “babysitter”
can be set in the personal namespace and expose
the resource to a friend who is in need of child care.
The name will be further mapped to a unique email
address of a babysitter. This naming scheme allows
the user a series of benefits.
In summary, relationship is a very important
component of security, identity, and policy enforce-
ment. Research in relationship oriented networking
is expected to be of significant use for the future
Internet. However, it is not trivial since multi-layer
relationships can be extremely complex and spawn
a lot of other issues such as security, identity and
naming, service, access control policies, etc. Never-
theless, research in this area is expected to result in
deeper insights into the nature of relationships and
complexities of constructing security models around
them.
3.2. Security Architecture for Networked Enter-
prises (SANE)
The SANE architecture [17] is designed to en-
hance security. The basic idea is to develop a clean-
slate security architecture to protect malicious net-
work attacks. SANE achieves this goal by requiring
all the network traffic to explicitly signal their ori-
gin and their intent to the network at the outset.
With this design goal in mind, SANE includes
a tailored security architecture for private networks
(enterprise network) with tight policy control by us-
ing a domain controller to control the network-wide
policies at a single location. For public settings, the
SANE architecture requires the end-host APIs to be
changed to allow the end-hosts to signal their intent
to the large scale Internet.
The SANE architecture implements the network-
wide policies in a central domain controller which
prevents inconsistencies in network security policies
by separating them from the underlying network
topology. A default-off mode is also enforced in the
SANE architecture which means that any host must
get the permission before they can talk to other
hosts, and any unauthorized transmission is disal-
lowed at the source. Network entities are granted
access to a minimum set of resources, and the infor-
mation about network structure and connectivity
is hidden from the end hosts. Precise control over
traffic is also implemented in SANE. SANE decides
the exact paths to be taken by the network traf-
fic and the source routes are also encrypted which
helps integrate middle-boxes and application-level
proxies without sacrificing security.
Figure 4: SANE Model
As shown in Fig. 4, hosts are only allowed to
communicate with the domain controller by default.
In step 0, through authentication, a client sets up a
secure channel with the domain controller for future
communication. Then in step 1, server B publishes
its service, ”B.http”, to the network service direc-
tory. In step 2, before client A talks to client B,
client A must obtain a capability for the service.
Then in step 3, client A prepends the returned ca-
pability on all the packets to the correspondent.
SANE offers a single protection layer for the pri-
vate networks which resides between the Ethernet
and IP layer. Note that all the network policies are
defined and granted at the domain controller.
A possible issue with SANE could be the cen-
tral control strategy which introduces a single point
of failure, single point of attack and scalability
problems into the architecture. There are also
some additional issues that need to be solved. For
example, SANE requires the switches to perform
per-packet cryptographic operations to decrypt the
source route which requires modifications and re-
design of the switches and may slow down the data
plane. Moreover, the end hosts also need to be
modified to address the malicious attacks. Mecha-
nisms to integrate the middle-box and proxies into
the SANE architecture pose to be important re-
search challenges. More detailed mechanisms and
designs to address these challenges need to be pre-
sented and validated before they can be applied to
the real world.
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3.3. Enabling Defense and Deterrence through Pri-
vate Attribution
Current network security mainly depends on de-
fenses which are mechanisms that could impede any
malicious activity. However, deterrence is also nec-
essary to reduce the threat and attacks in the In-
ternet. Thus, there is a requirement for a balance
between defense and deterrence in the future Inter-
net. Deterrence is usually affected by making use
of an attribution which is the combination of an
individual and an action. However, compared to
the physical world, it is much more difficult to gain
such an attribution in the Internet.
Two main design goals of this research project
[167] are: 1) preserving privacy, and 2) per-packet
attribution. Moreover, the security architecture
provides content-based privacy assurance and tries
to avoid any private information from leaking across
the network. This proposal requires every packet
to be self-identifying. Each packet is tagged with
a unique non-forgeable label identifying the source
host. The private attribution based on group sig-
nature allows the network elements to verify that
a packet was sent by a member of a given group.
Through the participation of a set of trusted au-
thorities, the privacy of the individual senders can
be ensured.
The per-packet attribution and the privacy
preservation ensure that all the packets are authen-
ticated and traceable. This reduces potential at-
tacks and offers deterrence to some extent, at the
same time maintains sender privacy by the use of a
shared-secret key mechanism.
Some of the challenges that need to be addressed
are: 1) decision regarding determining the source of
the traffic in situations where traffic may be relayed
by an intermediate host on behalf of the source host,
2) Tradeoff between the need for attribution secu-
rity and the users’ privacy, and 3) Technical details
for packet transformation, overhead reduction, and
guaranteeing minimum changes and impact on the
existing software.
3.4. Protecting User Privacy in a Network with
Ubiquitous Computing Devices
Ubiquitous presence and use of wireless comput-
ing devices has magnified the concern related to
privacy [160]. This concern is inherent to the de-
sign of the link-layer and lower layer protocols and
is not well addressed by the currently available ap-
proaches. In the next generation Internet, prolifera-
tion of these wireless computing devices is expected
to worsen the issue of privacy.
The central problem is to devise mechanism to
conceal the endpoints’ information from all parties
that do not need to know it for the network to func-
tion. For example, the IP addresses do not need to
be revealed to all providers along the network path
except for the immediate provider. Sources are as-
sumed to trust their immediate provider more than
any other transit provider on the network path. By
doing this, the user’s privacy can be guaranteed and
it can also be manageable and accountable.
In this proposal, encrypted addresses are used
to provide privacy. Entire packets including their
addresses can be encrypted over links so that the
identities can be hidden from other users of the net-
work. Re-routing is also avoided in this architecture
to remain efficient across the whole path.
For service discovery, cryptographic mechanisms
can also be explored to protect the privacy of
searches, responses, and beacons. But because of
different privacy requirements, this issue is difficult
to resolve. An effort is made to develop a single
mechanism that can transition between these dif-
ferent classes of networks. Also, methods to allow
the client devices to privately discover a service even
when they are connected to un-trusted provider are
explored.
Besides host addresses and network names, some
other “implicit identifiers” can also leak informa-
tion about the user’s identity, and need to be
concealed from untrusted parties. Moreover, the
project proposes to commit in-depth research on
defining communication privacy in human terms
since privacy is ultimately about humans and can-
not be simply delivered by the network without hu-
man interaction. Thus, the privacy scenarios and
policies need to be explicitly presented to the users
in order to keep them informed and the users need
to be able to to dictate their policy requirements as
necessary.
To realize these design goals, there are several
unavoidable challenges. Firstly, the names and ad-
dresses should be designed to conceal identity in-
stead of leaking them. However, identity cannot
be concealed completely since some information is
needed to be understood by the network devices to
accomplish certain functions. Thus, the names and
addresses need to be designed carefully to conceal
important information from the untrusted parties
and to reveal proper information to authorized or
trusted parties. Also, broadcast links such as wire-
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less networks have different requirements than gen-
eral wired network paths. Moreover, different layers
may have bindings of the names and addresses and
the identities may be revealed in multiple levels.
Thus, an additional requirement is to ensure that
an identity is revealed only after it is known that the
binding is authorized. This new requirement forces
major changes to the design in the current Internet.
Managing information exposure of implicit names
and identifiers and appropriate exposure of privacy
are some of the major design challenges that need
to be addressed.
3.5. Pervasive and Trustworthy Network and Ser-
vice Infrastructures
“Trustworthy networks and service infrastruc-
ture” [27] is the name of the European Union’s
Framework Program 7 (FP7) research plan on se-
curity of the future Internet. This is an umbrella
project for security specific research consisting of a
lot of different projects researching different aspects
of network security. There are four main goals:
1. Trustworthy network infrastructure
2. Trustworthy service infrastructure
3. Technologies and tools for trustworthy net-
works
4. Networking, coordination and support
Most of these projects are still at their initial
phases and hence not much technical details ex-
cept for their initial proposals and task goals are
available at this point.
The trustworthy network infrastructure research
is dedicated to finding new architecture designs for
future heterogeneous networks and systems which
are designed with built-in security, reliability, and
privacy, with secure policies across multiple do-
mains and networks, and with trustworthy oper-
ation and management of billions of devices or
“things” connected to the Internet. It also includes
the research and development of trustworthy plat-
forms for monitoring and managing malicious net-
work threats across multiple domains or organiza-
tions. Typical E.U. FP7 projects on this topic in-
clude ECRYPT II [31] (on future encryption tech-
nologies), INTERSECTION [56] (on the vulnera-
bilities at the interaction point of different service
providers), AWISSENET [11] (on security and error
resilience on wireless ad-hoc networks and sensor
networks), and SWIFT [171] (on future cross-layer
identity management framework).
The second research area is to develop a secure
service architecture. Secure and trustworthy ser-
vice architecture is an immediate requirement to
support the huge growth of Internet business ap-
plications and services. Thus, a strong need for
service security properties such as reliability, avail-
ability, trust, data integrity, information confiden-
tiality, and resilience to faults or malicious attacks
is identified. To meet the various requirements,
new advances in the fields of secure software engi-
neering, modeling, and languages and tools need to
be achieved. Two important research goals of this
effort are the specification and validation of secu-
rity properties of the service architecture and plat-
forms, and the technologies for managing and en-
suring security level in different environments. Typ-
ical projects under this research topic include MAS-
TER [76] (managing and auditing using secure indi-
cators), TAS3 [172] (trusted service-oriented archi-
tecture based on user-controlled data management
policies), and AVANTSSAR [9] (specifying and val-
idating the trust and security properties of service).
Technologies and tools for trustworthy network
research include pro-active protection from threats
in the future networks with high volume of network
entities, user-centric privacy and identity manage-
ment, management and assurance of security and
integrity, etc. Typical E.U. projects on this topic
include MOBIO [82] (on biometric technologies),
ECRYPT II [31] (on cryptology), TECOM [173]
(on trustable systems), and SHIELDS [164] (secure
software engineering technologies).
3.6. Anti-Spam Research Group (ASRG)
There has been a substantial increase in the num-
ber of problematic e-mail, which is generally called
spam. At an extreme point, spam could threaten
the usability of the e-mail service. Recently, the sit-
uation is already quite severe and is getting worse.
ASRG [8] is a working group of Internet Re-
search Task Force (IRTF) which is focusing on re-
search on Anti-Spam technologies. ASRG investi-
gates tools and techniques to mitigate the effects
of spam. Grabbing the underlying basic character-
istics of spam, this group is motivated to develop
solutions and approaches that can be designed, de-
ployed and used in the short term. To be more
specific, the related work areas include potential
new administrative tools and techniques, improved
anti-spam tools and techniques, evaluation frame-
works and measurement, and approaches that in-
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volve changes to the existing applications and pro-
tocols.
Through the past decade, many anti-spam tech-
nologies have been invented to tackle the current
challenges in anti-spam [7]. Typical examples in-
clude:
1. Message Content Techniques: This is the basic
anti-spam technique and includes three cate-
gories: static filtering, adaptive filtering, and
URL filtering. Static filtering is very simple
that it tries to filter the spam by setting the
static addresses or subject keywords. Adap-
tive filtering is relatively advanced in that it
can adjust the filtering based on experience. A
typical example is Bayesian filters. URL fil-
tering is based on the fact that spam always
contains redirecting URLs to certain websites.
Software can be used to extract the URLs from
the body of message and check them against a
blacklist. Since URLs in the spam change too
frequently, it is a hard task to maintain this
blacklist and a lot of spam traps are required to
collect spam. Generally, the efficiency of URL
filtering ranges from 50% to 70%, and the false
positive rate can be around 0.1%.
2. Techniques Based on SMTP: Another cate-
gory of anti-spam technique makes use of the
SMTP protocol. It includes timing and proto-
col defects technique, greylist, callbacks, and
rate limits technique. Timing and protocol
defects technique detects extra data in the
input buffer prior to the server sending the
HELO/EHLO response, thus reducing spam
spreading. Greylist is effective against those
spammers who use cracked PC to send spam
but ineffective against spammers sending from
conventional machines. The “Greylist” tech-
nique attempts to detect SMTP clients that
are not true SMTP servers and do not main-
tain a message queue by initially deferring the
incoming messages by giving a 4xx (tempo-
rary failure) response during the SMTP proto-
col dialogue. The “Callbacks” technique is of
relatively low effectiveness because the spam-
mers can escape this mechanism very easily.
“Rate limits” technique’s basic idea is that the
robot spammers always send burst of messages
faster than humans and legitimate mail servers.
Thus, a SMTP server can count the number of
connections per client over a time window. It
is obvious that the rate limiting technique is
ineffective to be considered in a real anti-spam
solution; however, it is very effective against
DoS (denial of service) spam.
3. Address Management: Address management
techniques include tagged addresses, code
words, disposal addresses, and DNS (domain
name system) blacklists. Tagged addresses and
code words are similar in that they add a sec-
ond part to an existing address that is used for
sorting or filtering mail instead of mail routing.
A disposable address is an address that can be
disabled when spam comes. A disposable ad-
dress is used in situations where users need to
receive emails from unknown entities that may
send spam in the future. Thus, the disposable
email address is revealed rather than the real
email address and it is hidden from the attacks
of spam bots.
4. Network Techniques: Network techniques in-
clude DNS blacklists, DNS validation, and
HELO/EHLO pattern matching. DNS black-
lists are lists of IP addresses that share an
undesirable characteristic such as a history of
sending spam. DNS validation techniques ver-
ify the SMTP client by comparing the proper
DNS records related to it. HELO/EHLO pat-
tern matching techniques try to look for strings
with high likelihood of being a spam sender
and low likelihood of being a legitimate orga-
nization or user.
5. White-list Techniques: White-list techniques
are typically achieved by recognizing known
correspondents and adding them to a whitelist.
The disadvantages are that it requires users to
manually maintain the list.
4. Content Distribution Mechanisms
The content distribution mechanisms of the In-
ternet have evolved from centralized server based
distribution mechanisms to the more modern dis-
tributed approaches of Content Distribution Net-
works (CDNs) and Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems.
The popularity of the web, high quality content
creation for dissemination and the increased band-
width provisioned at the network edge can be cred-
ited to be some of the motivations behind this evo-
lution. In this section, we shall retrace this evolu-
tion and try to motivate the need for future Internet
research in content delivery mechanisms and intro-
duce some very innovative proposals that are being
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studied to define the future of content delivery in
the Internet.
4.1. Next Generation CDN
Initially, the concept of content distribution net-
works was introduced to mitigate the load on cen-
tral servers. Central servers could offload the re-
sponsibility of delivering high bandwidth content to
CDNs. As an example, a webpage downloaded from
“abc.com” would contain pictures, videos, audio
and other such multimedia high bandwidth content.
The central server at abc.com would serve only the
basic webpage while redirecting the browser to a
CDN to fetch all the multimedia content. This
mechanism worked since CDN servers were net-
worked and placed strategically in the core network
and were provisioned with high bandwidth links.
CDNs moved the content closer to the end-user and,
thus, ensured lower delay. However, measurement
of content distribution data shows that only 50 per-
cent of the Internet traffic is served from the top
35 core networks [69]. The rest of the data dis-
tribution has a long tail and spread across 13,000
network sites in the current Internet. As a result
of this skew-ness, the present state-of-art of CDNs
still suffer from the “Fat file Paradox” [122, 69].
Since the data travels on the Internet almost at
the speed of light, it might seem, apparently (and
hence a paradox), that the distance between the
source and destination should not matter. How-
ever, it turns out, that even in the absence of con-
gestion, the “middle mile” encounters delays as a
result of peering problems between transit ISP’s,
DoS attacks, Link failures etc. Congestion in the
intermediate routers worsens the problem. Also,
neither the servers nor the clients have any control
over the “middle mile”.
Also, it is projected that, with high quality con-
tent such as High Definition Television soon making
its way to the Internet, the Internet would need to
provision a bandwidth of 100 TB/sec in the near
future[69]. The “middle-mile problem”, discussed
above, shall become more pronounced in the pres-
ence of such high data volumes. To mitigate this, a
new solution for highly-distributed CDNs has been
proposed. These highly-distributed CDNs place
servers at the edge networks, thus abolishing the
“middle mile” completely. However, these CDN
networks still suffer from the limitation of being
able to serve only cacheable content. Also, highly
distributed architectures come at the cost of in-
creased security, management and synchronization
problems. It is quite clear that the future of CDNs
shall have to serve data from distribution points as
close to the clients as possible.
4.2. Next Generation P2P
Another paradigm of data distribution that has
evolved over the years is Peer-to-Peer (P2P) net-
works. Initially born as a simple music sharing
application Napster [123, 190], P2P networks have
progressed tremendously and are responsible for a
lion share of the Internet traffic today [154, 12].
The key idea is that, in P2P networks, peers (or
end hosts) share content among themselves, thus
abolishing the need of a central server. In doing
so peers act as “servents” – servers when uploading
data for other peer/peers, client when downloading
data from peer/peers. An extensive survey on P2P
networks can be found at [4].
The self-organizing and self-healing properties
of P2P networks guarantee tremendous potential
to become the predominant content distribution
mechanism of the future Internet. However, a de-
clining trend in the popularity of P2P networks is
being observed over the past year or so, being chal-
lenged by the advances in streaming video technolo-
gies [124, 18]. The reason for this decline may be
attributed to certain fundamental problems under-
lying the basic mechanisms of P2P networks.
The first problem is that bandwidth provisioning
to end hosts at edge networks is generally asym-
metric. The download bandwidth is far higher than
the upload bandwidths. This leads to condition of
instability when the number of peer-clients for a
particular content far outnumber the peer-servers.
The second problem is related to dynamics of
sharing. Selfish behavior is common in peers,
wherein the peers want to act only as clients and
never as servers. Incentive based mechanisms, con-
trolling the download bandwidth available to a peer
depending on its upload bandwidth, has been de-
vised in modern P2P systems such as BitTorrent
[125].
Finally, the third problem is the tussle of interests
between P2P systems and the ISP’s. P2P systems
form an overlay network of peers oblivious of the
underlying IP network topology. This results in
data dissemination amongst P2P peers such that
they may contradict the traffic engineering poli-
cies of the underlying provider IP networks leading
to selection of more expensive routes, endangering
peering policies between ISPs etc. The P4P [126]
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group is working to investigate methods for the ben-
eficial co-existence of P2P networks and ISPs. One
possible solution is to develop P2P mechanisms that
are aware of the underlying topology and the loca-
tion of peers [182]. An oracle mechanism wherein
the ISPs assist the P2P networks in selecting peers
has been described in [1].
P2P as a technology is extremely potent to serve
as the next generation content delivery mechanism,
mostly because of its scalability, resilience, self-
configuration and self-healing properties. Research
groups, such as P2P-Next [127], are working to-
wards solutions for topology-aware P2P, carrying
legal and licensed content for media channels such
as IPTV, Video on demand, etc. We think, these
research initiatives are important to properly guide
the evolution of P2P systems into alleviating the
huge data dissemination needs of the future Inter-
net.
4.3. Swarming Architecture
A data dissemination architecture for the future
Internet based on some established techniques of
the P2P world is proposed in [179]. A “swarm”
(as used in the context of P2P systems) is a set
of loosely connected hosts that act in a selfish and
highly decentralized manner to provide local and
system level robustness through active adaptation.
BitTorrent is an extremely successful “swarming”
P2P system. BitTorrent solves the traditional P2P
problems of “leeching” (clients downloading files
and not sharing it with other peers) and low up-
load capacity of peers. To counter leeching, Bittor-
rent employs a tit-for-tat mechanism wherein the
download speed of a peer is dependant on quan-
tity of data it shares. Also, Bittorrent implements
a multi-point to point mechanism wherein a file is
downloaded in pieces from multiple location thus
leveraging the fact that the download capacity of
a peer is generally much higher than the upload
capacity.
Although Bittorent solves the problem of flash
crowds (sudden high popularity of a content)
through its swarming model, it does not have good
support for a post-popularity download when only a
few seeds for the content may exist and the demand
for the content is not very high. Also, Bittorrent
uses a centralized architecture for its tracker and,
hence, introduces a single point of failure. Thus,
in scenarios like that of a delay tolerant networks
(DTN), if the tracker is unreachable from the peer,
the peer cannot download data even though all the
peers uploading the file may be within communica-
tion reach of the DTN peer. The mechanisms intro-
duced to counter this situation are to use replicated
trackers or Distributed Hash Tree (DHT) tracking
mechanisms. However, replicated trackers result
in un-unified swarms (multiple swarms for a single
file) while DHT mechanisms introduce additional
latency and burden on the peers.
Despite some of these drawbacks, Bittorrent, as
of 2004, was reported to be carrying one third of
the total Internet traffic [121, 174]. Motivated by
the huge success of swarming systems like Bittor-
rent, [179] proposes to investigate the feasibility of
a swarming architecture, named uswarm, as the ba-
sis for content delivery in the future Internet. Some
of the key modifications needed to define an archi-
tecture based on swarming, rather than an isolated
service are: (1) A generic naming and resolution
service, (2) A massively distributed tracking sys-
tem, (3) Economic and social incentive model, and
(4) support for in-network caches to be a part of
the swarm architecture.
To be the basis for content distribution architec-
ture, uswarm needs to devise a generic naming and
resolution mechanism. The objective of this mech-
anism, called the Intent Resolution Service or IRS,
is to translate intent specified in an application spe-
cific form, such as URL, CSS etc., to a standardized
meta-data and resolving the meta-data (Meta-data
Resolution Service or MRS) to a set of peers that
can serve the data. The MRS service is devised us-
ing a combination of: (1) Highly replicated tracking
using logically centralized tracking system like the
DNS, (2) in-network tracking where a gateway may
intercept the request and process it, and (3) peer-
to-peer tracking using peer-to-peer gossip mecha-
nisms as in KaZaa[128], Gnutella[129] etc. All these
tracking mechanisms are highly distributed and are
expected to significantly improve the availability of
the system.
Uswarm is an unified swarming model. Unlike
Bittorrent-like models where each file is associated
with its own swarm, uswarm advocates a unified
swarm. In an unified swarm, peers are not con-
nected loosely together based on a particular con-
tent, but they are all part of the system and help
each other attain their objectives. As an example,
suppose there are two files, A and B, each with
their associated swarm, A swarm and B swarm, re-
spectively. Also suppose that the peers of B swarm
already have the file A and similarly the peers of
B swarm already have the file A. In such a situa-
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tion, A swarm could contribute to B swarm by pro-
viding a pre-formed swarm for file B and similarly
B swarm could contribute to A swarm.
The co-operative swarming mechanism requires
some fundamental extensions to Bittorrent-like in-
centive mechanisms. Uswarm uses the same “tit-
for-tat” principal of the Bittorrent incentive mech-
anism but extends it to provide incentive for a
peer to upload blocks from multiple files (rather
than only the file that it is presently downloading)
to support the co-operative swarming paradigm of
uswarm. Also, a control plane incentive mecha-
nism needs to be developed for uswarm since it
depends on a distributed peer-to-peer mechanism
for control messages for the Meta-data Resolution
Service. The control plane incentive mechanism in-
cludes (1) tit-for–tat, keeping track of peers that
are most helpful for resolving control messages, and
(2) dynamic topology adaptation in which peers se-
lect their neighbors dynamically based on the how
helpful they are.
Thus, uswarm seems to solve some of the prob-
lems preventing P2P systems from being the dom-
inant content carrying technology of the future (in
Section 5.2). Also, leveraging in-network caches,
uswarm addresses some of the concerns of the P2P-
ISP tussle and also has some flavors of the con-
tent centric networking architecture mechanisms
discussed in Section 5.4.
4.4. Content Centric Networking
Content Centric Networking or CCN [58] is a new
idea that proposes a paradigm shift from the tradi-
tional host centric design of the current Internet to
a content centric view of the future Internet. CCN
is motivated by the fact that the Internet of today,
as was designed around 40 years ago, has lost its
relevance in the present context of its use. While
designed originally, as a mechanism to share dis-
tributed resources (access to a printer attached to
a single remote host in the organization), the Inter-
net is used more for content delivery today. Since
resource access and data access are fundamentally
different with completely different properties, the
Internet needs to be re-designed to accommodate
the present context.
CCN is based on the observation that it does
not really matter (at least a high percentage of the
time) where data comes from as long as it is valid,
secure and authentic. The idea of CCN is to design
a new content distribution mechanism as an over-
lay above the IP networks, leveraging the low cost
of persistent storage. Data has the property that it
is replicable. Also, data may be cached at various
points in the network. Popular content dissemi-
nation on the current Internet involves millions of
unicast copies of the same content to be distributed
end-to-end. Though serving duplicate copies of the
same content, the routers are neither designed nor
have an incentive to cache the content and serve
from a local copy whenever a request for the same
content is encountered. CCN describes a scenario
where the intermediate ISP routers cache content,
client content requests are broadcasted in a con-
trolled manner and intermediate nodes that have
incentive to serve the content from their caches and
receive a request for the content may serve the con-
tent from their local storage. The primary motiva-
tion for ISPs to deploy CCN is the lost revenue to
content delivery networks (CDNs) where they may
double up as CDN themselves and provide value
added services for their customers above the exist-
ing plain packet carrying services.
Thus, CCN has the potential to impact the future
Internet design in a considerable way. In-fact its
almost Copernican innovation of placing data as the
centre of networking is an exciting networking idea.
In the next sub-section, we shall discuss DONA,
which shares similar views as that of CCN but is
fundamentally different in its implementation ideas.
4.5. Data-Oriented Network Architecture
The Data Oriented Network Architecture
(DONA) [61] proposes a clean-slate architectural
idea similar to CCN. Both, DONA and CCN,
advocate a paradigm shift from the present host
centric architecture of the Internet to a data
centric architecture. However, while CCN proposes
a network-wide caching mechanism at various
network nodes, leveraging the dipping cost of
persistent storage, and thus defining an efficient
content dissemination system as an overlay over
the present IP networks, DONA emphasizes a
novel mechanism for naming of content and name
resolution to build an architecture around service
and data access.
The three most desirable properties for data and
service access are: (1) Persistence – the name of a
service or data object remains valid as long as the
service or data is available, (2) Availability – data or
service should have a high degree of reliability and
acceptable latency, and (3) Authenticity – data can
be verified to have come from a particular source.
Unfortunately, in the present host centric design
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of the Internet, these three basic requirements of
data and service access are not provided naturally.
The current design defines mechanisms to access
particular hosts and, thus, implicitly limits data to
a host. DONA proposes a novel mechanism of ex-
plicitly naming data or service and routing on these
names for data or service access.
The key mechanism in DONA involves explic-
itly naming of data or service around a “principal”,
where a principal is the owner/creator of the data
or service. The names are of the form P:L, where
“P” is the cryptographic hash of the principals pub-
lic key and “L” is a label for the data/service cho-
sen by the principal. The next step of mapping a
the data/service name to a location is undertaken
through a routing on name mechanism. The rout-
ing structure is composed of entities called “routing
handlers” or RH’s which are responsible for routing
data names (P:L) to particular data servers. A data
server may be any host that has a copy of the data
and is entitled to serve it.
Two basic primitives “FIND” and “REGISTER”
are defined. Any host, entitled to serve data P:L
may register it with its local RH in the same au-
tonomous system (AS). The local RH advertises it
to the RH’s in the neighboring ASs following the AS
level routing policies of BGP. A client, seeking ac-
cess to a data, sends out a FIND (P:L). The FIND
message is routed across RH’s, till the nearest copy
of the data is found. FIND also initiates a trans-
port level connection. In the case where RH’s cache
data, data exchange starts between the client and
the RH, else, after the FIND has been resolved to a
particular host, a direct IP level exchange between
the client and the server is initiated.
Routing has desirable properties of finding the
shortest or most optimal path and also routing
around failures. Thus, by routing on data names,
DONA achieves the same reliability and self heal-
ing properties in the context of data access that
the current Internet has for host access. Flat cryp-
tographic names associated with principals helps
authenticate data validity and data source. Also,
the DONA mechanism of late binding of data to
the server host achieves persistence of data (data
is available as long as it exists) and thus frees its
dependency from the persistence of the host.
Unlike other methods of data dissemination (with
the exception of CCN) discussed in this section,
DONA defines the whole architecture of the fu-
ture Internet around data delivery. In the DONA
context, other mechanisms such as P2P and CDNs
shall be just special cases using the DONA primi-
tives in different ways.
To summarize, in this section, we discussed some
of the potential mechanisms that shall contribute to
content delivery services in the next generation In-
ternet. Some of these mechanisms such as CDN,
even with its extensions may not be considered
strictly next generation since they are not clean
slate and thus their transition is imminent in the
immediate future. However, the benefits of these
mechanisms are limited compared to the more am-
bitious clean-slate ideas of CCN and DONA. P2P
mechanisms are already a dominant carrier of con-
tent in the current Internet and their incorporation
into a systematic architectural design as in uswarm,
P2Pnext, and P4P is expected to prepare it for the
next generation. However, we believe that content
in the Internet cannot be generically classified un-
der a few common attributes and hence more than
one of these mechanisms are expected to co-exist
and thus reiterating the requirement that the fu-
ture Internet needs to support diversity even at the
core architectural levels.
5. Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networks
(DTN) and Related Architectures
Delay/Disruption tolerant networking research is
already an active area of research, guided mostly by
the DTN working group at the Internet Research
Task Force (IRTF) [131]. Developed initially as
part of an effort to develop Interplanetary Internet
(IPN) [130] for deep space communication, it was
soon realized that the concepts developed therein
could as well be applied to a number of similar con-
texts in terrestrial networking and was broadly clas-
sified as “challenged networks” [24, 33, 34].
A “bundle protocol” has been developed as an
“end-to-end message-oriented overlay” [158]. The
bundle protocol sits on top of the transport layer
(or other) of the underlying network and provides
“store-forward” services (through management of
persistent storage at intermediary nodes) to the ap-
plication layer above it, to help cope with inter-
mittent connectivity. It stores and forwards “bun-
dles” that are variable-sized, generally long mes-
sages transformed from arbitrarily long application
data, to aid in efficient scheduling and utilization
of communication opportunities of contacts.
One of the interesting features of DTN networks
is that the end-to-end principle is re-defined such
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that it is still valid in the context of a DTN en-
vironment. Accordingly, the bundle protocol de-
fines the mechanism of “custody transfer”. When
an intermediate node ‘N” (a node in the hop-by-
hop path, between source and destination) receives
a bundle with custody transfer, and if it accepts
custody of the bundle, then it assumes the responsi-
bility for reliable delivery of the bundle. This allows
the node that transfers the custody to node N to
delete the bundle from its buffer. Such a notion of
reliability is relevant in the DTN context as against
the end-to-end principle since the source node may
not be connected long enough to ensure end-to-end
reliability. Recently, there have been criticisms of
the bundle protocol about its efficacy in disrupted
and error prone networks and can be referred to at
[184]. Several other features of the bundle protocol
may be obtained in detail from the relevant RFC’s
[158, 24, 35, 149, 19].
Another important issue with DTN is routing
[59]. Supposedly, “intermittent connectivity” seems
to be the only common attribute of all DTN envi-
ronments. Other than that, DTNs vary greatly on
the parameters of delay, error, mobility etc. More-
over, based on the nature of topological dynamic-
ity, they can be re-classified into deterministic and
stochastic systems. Various routing protocols spec-
ified for DTNs try to address routing in any one of
these operating environments.
While routing in deterministic contexts are eas-
ier, an “epidemic routing” [148] scheme has been
designed for routing in highly random conditions.
In epidemic routing, a message received at a given
intermediary node is forwarded to all nodes except
the one on which the message arrived. Also, a relay
based approach may be used in networks with high
degree of mobility. In the relay-based approach, if
the route to the destination is not available, the
node does a “controlled broadcast” of the message
to its immediate neighbors. All nodes that receive
this packet store it in their memory and enter a re-
laying mode. In the relaying mode, a node checks
whether a routing entry for the destination exist
and forwards the packet. If no paths exist and if the
buffer at the node is not full, the packet is stored
in the node’s buffer replacing any older copies of
the packet already in the buffer. There are a plenty
of routing protocols for delay-tolerant networks and
[189] presents an exhaustive survey of the existing
routing protocols and the context within which they
are most suitable for operation.
5.1. Next Generation of DTN research
Delay Tolerant Networking was introduced, ini-
tially, in the context of deep-space communications.
Extensions of the concepts developed therein have
been extended to a wide range of networking con-
texts that have either high-delay or high bit error
rate. In this section, we describe four such contexts
that employ the methods of DTN, either to enable
or to optimize their data communication scenario
and also represent ample potential to be an integral
part of the next generation networking paradigm.
5.2. Delay/Fault tolerant Mobile Sensor Networks
(DFT-MSN)
Classical sensor networking research is generally
focused on developing techniques to achieve high
data throughput while minimizing power consump-
tion. As a matter of fact, the radio module is one of
the significant power consumers on the sensor node.
Hence, a lot of energy efficiency mechanisms of sen-
sor networks involve optimized use of the radio re-
source. A significant gain in power conservation can
be achieved by turning the radio to sleep for most
of the time, waking it up periodically to receive
or send data. Such schemes can benefit from the
store and forward methods developed for DTNs to
handle communication over intermittently available
links. SeNDT[133], DTN/SN[134], ad-hoc seismic
array developed at CENS[132] projects are some ex-
amples that employ this technique to attain higher
power utilization on their sensor nodes.
Apart from DTN techniques to optimize power
consumptions, DFT-MSN’s represent actual sce-
narios where a DTN-like context is experienced.
An example of such a scenario with node mobil-
ity, intermittent connectivity and delay and fault
tolerant networking context of wireless sensor net-
works is presented in [55]. For such applications,
such as environmental pollution monitoring using
mobile sensors, conventional sensor network proto-
cols do not suffice since they are designed to opti-
mize throughput versus power consumption while
assuming abundant bandwidth and deterministic
and controlled connectivity. On the other hand,
classical DTN networks represent the context of in-
termittent and opportunistic connectivity, high de-
lay and error rates, but without much concern for
power conservation. DFT-MSN’s, thus, represent a
new class of networks that resemble the context of
DTN’s with the additional constraints of optimizing
power consumption.
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A cross layer protocol design for DFT-MSN com-
munication is described in [181]. The idea is to de-
sign a data delivery protocol based on two parame-
ters, (1) nodal delivery probability, and (2) message
fault tolerance. In the context of a network of sen-
sors with random mobility patterns and hence in-
termittent delivery opportunities, the nodal deliv-
ery probability is a parameter that depends on the
history of the node’s successful/unsuccessful trans-
mission of data to another node that has a higher
probability of forwarding the data towards the sink.
Message fault tolerance is achieved by having mul-
tiple copies of the message in the buffers of various
mobile nodes, thus having a high probability of get-
ting at-least one copy to be eventually forwarded to
the sink. To control the level of redundancy a fault
tolerance degree (FTD) parameter for the message
is calculated each time it is transmitted from one
node to the other. FTD is zero when the message
first originates and increases (thus loosing priority)
each time it is transmitted. The FTD serves as
the parameter for data queue management at each
node thus bounding the level of redundancy. Based
on these parameters, the cross layer protocol itself
consists of two modes, 1) sleep mode – to conserve
power, and 2) work mode. The work mode has
two phases: (1) Asynchronous phase, and (2) Syn-
chronous phase.
1. Asynchronous Phase: This is similar to con-
ventional asynchronous phase RTS/CTS (Re-
quest to send/Clear to send) handshaking of
the IEEE 802.11 protocol where the node
wakes up from sleep, contends over the shared
channel for a chance to transmit, sends an RTS
message, waits for a CTS from the receiver and
finally starts transmitting the message in the
synchronous mode. In DFT-MSN, the wire-
less nodes exchange the parameters of nodal
delivery probability and available buffer space
in the RTS/CTS exchange. These parameters
are the basis of the nodes decision process of
whether to forward a message at the given op-
portunity that shall maximize the chances of
the message reaching the sink and at the same
time keeping redundancy under bounds.
2. Synchronous Phase: In this phase, the data
transmission is synchronized and hence there
is no contention. After receiving the CTS from
multiple nodes in the asynchronous phase, the
node selects a subset of nodes fit for data for-
warding and accordingly sends out a “sched-
ule” for synchronized data dissemination.
Based on these phases, the protocol can be op-
timized to achieve a tradeoff between sleep time
and link utilization. A simple scheme, proposed in
[181], allows the node to sleep for a specific time
“T”, determined by two factors: (1) the number
of successful transmissions in the last “n” working
cycles, and (2) available message buffer, enforcing
short sleeping periods if buffer is full. This mecha-
nism allows the nodes of a DFT-MSN to conserve
their power and at the same time maximize the util-
ity of communication opportunities.
Many networks of the future should benefit from
the research of DFT-MSN as we move towards
an energy efficient system design paradigm in all
spheres of engineering. The research in this area
is still not mature with only a few proposals and
application areas defined as yet. However, owing
to the context in which it operates, it is certainly
going to add value to the efforts of future Internet
designs.
5.3. Postcards from the edge: ORBIT
The cache-and-forward paradigm of de-
lay/disruption tolerant network has been proposed
by [187], named ORBIT, to be developed as the
basis for an independent network level service to
accommodate the huge growth in wireless access
technologies at the edge of the Internet. The key
motivation for the development of an ORBIT-like
network level service is:
1. Advances in wireless access technologies have
spawned a huge growth in the number of wire-
less devices connected at the edge of the Inter-
net. Most of these devices are mobile leading
to intermittent connectivity due to factors such
as failure of the radio path, contention for ac-
cess etc. The original Internet was designed
under the assumption of persistent end-to-end
connected hosts and, thus, the TCP/IP pro-
tocols fail to accommodate such an operating
environment.
2. Original routers were designed when storage at
routers was expensive. The diminishing cost of
memory makes architectures like store-forward
(requiring persistent storage resources at the
routers) more feasible today than before.
3. The future Internet is being designed to al-
low the coexistence of multiple architectures
through virtualization. Thus, it is much easier
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for newer paradigms in networking architecture
to be defined today, than ever before.
The ORBIT architectural elements consist of
wired backbone routers, access routers and mobile
nodes. It is assumed that each of these network
elements shall have considerable amount of persis-
tent storage. The idea is to develop an architecture
based on the store-forward paradigm of DTNs such
that every mobile node is bound to a set of “post
office” nodes. These post office nodes are respon-
sible for caching the data on behalf of the mobile
node during periods of disconnection and oppor-
tunistically deliver it when feasible, either directly
or through a series of wireless hops.
The design space for the transport layer looks
pretty similar to that in classical DTN networks in
the sense that they deviate considerably from the
end-to-end paradigm of conventional transport pro-
tocols of the Internet. Additionally, a naming pro-
tocol needs to be specified that maps a node to a set
of post-office nodes. The routing protocol, to route
packets to a wired cache and forward (CNF) node
is similar to the Inter-AS and Intra-AS routing of
the current Internet. CNFs belonging to the same
AS exchange reachability information among them-
selves along with detailed path descriptions (link
state, preferred modes of data reception etc.) while
Inter-AS routing involves exchange of just reacha-
bility path vector information.
However, defining an Internet wide store and for-
ward file delivery service has lots of additional chal-
lenges. A primary challenge would be that of secu-
rity, with the file being cached at various nodes in
the network. Two conceivable security threats are
those of (1) unauthorized access to a file from the
cache of an intermediate node, and (2) DoS attacks
on network elements by artificially filling up their
storage. Also, congestion control mechanisms in
ORBIT-like scenario become more important than
in DTN scenarios because of the scale of operation
of such a network and the finite memory. Another
issue that we think might be relevant is that of con-
trolled redundancy. A sound principle needs to be
developed to control the number of copies of the
file existing at the various intermediate nodes. This
would have huge implications on the scalability of
the system.
Research efforts, such as ORBIT, are very rel-
evant for the next generation Internet, especially
with the emergence of data-centric networking
paradigm. Such data-centric network designs could
benefit from ORBIT-like research efforts in defin-
ing a Internet-wide efficient caching and delivery
system for data.
5.4. Disaster day After Networks (DAN)
A DTN-like challenged network scenario is en-
countered in disaster-day after networks (after a
hurricane or a terrorist attack). An instance of a
disaster day after networks (DAN), Phoenix [73],
proposes a novel architecture for “survivable net-
working in disaster scenarios”.
The robustness mechanism built-in into the orig-
inal Internet was designed for fail-stop robustness,
in that it could isolate troubled areas (congested
routes, broken links, etc.) and ensure connectivity
to the existing parts of the infrastructure. Such fail-
stop robustness is not suitable in scenarios where
disasters are expected to be of smaller scale, lo-
calized, partial or intermittent connectivity, het-
erogeneous contexts and severely limited resources.
The DAN (Day-After Networks) proposal, Phoenix,
seeks to define a new architectural framework for
providing communication support across diverse,
mobile and wireless nodes, intermittently connected
to each other, to cooperatively form a rescue and re-
covery communication service network under chal-
lenged conditions.
The two major design requirements for Phoenix
are: (1) Role based networking and (2) communi-
cation over heterogeneous devices. The networking
paradigm in such situations is mostly host-service
based rather than being host-host based. Role-
based anycast routing mechanisms are best suited,
both, for routing efficiency in such challenged condi-
tions and contextual mapping of the services to the
available resources. The main objective of Phoenix
is to utilize all available resources for communica-
tion, power supply, etc. This motivated the design
of an architecture that allows the co-existance of
multiple heterogeneous communication devices.
Although inspired by the design of De-
lay/Disruption Tolerant Network (DTN), DAN’s
presents a new networking context as opposed to
the classical networking contexts of DTNs. Since
the topology in a DAN is extremely dynamic, tra-
ditional topology based naming of the Internet and
DTN [59] routing is not appropriate. Most other
classes of DTN’s such as inter-planetary networks
and rural connectivity networks have almost ex-
act knowledge about available storage resources and
mobility patterns. Such information is not available
to DAN’s. Also, being a service-host paradigm and
18
limited in topological and service diversity, DAN is
able to optimize its routing using anycasting. Such
role-based methods are generally not employed for
traditional DAN’s. Apart from these, DAN’s also
have to (1) deal with a higher degree of diversity
in its underlying communication technology, (2) of-
fer better optimizations in the use of redundancy
for resilience, (3) better use resources such as stor-
age and communication opportunities, (4) define
a more stricter prioritization of traffic to ensure
timely dissemination of critical life-saving data, (5)
formulate incentive schemes for sharing personal re-
sources for common good, and (6) define security
mechanisms to protect against potential abuse of
resources, compared to most classical DTN scenar-
ios.
The architectural elements of Phoenix incor-
porate all available resources ranging from per-
sonal wireless devices such as cellular phones, home
WLANs, external energy resources such as car
batteries, wide-area broadcast channels, dedicated
short-range communication systems (DSRC’s) etc.
They incorporate these resources into one cohesive
host-service network and provide an unified com-
munication channel for disaster recovery and res-
cue operations, till the original infrastructure for
communication is re-instated. To achieve this con-
vergence and the stated objectives of DANs in gen-
eral, Phoenix relies on two underlying communi-
cation protocols: (1) The Phoenix Interconnectiv-
ity protocol (PIP) and, (2) The Phoenix Transport
Protocol (PTP).
1. Phoenix Interconnectivity Protocol (PIP): In
a DAN scenario, the communication nodes are
expected to be partitioned into a number of
temporarily disconnected “clusters” and each
cluster comprising of one or more “network
segments” using different communication tech-
nologies. A multi-interface node supporting
multiple access technologies can bridge two or
more network segments. Also, node mobil-
ity, disaster recovery activities and topology
changes may initiate connection between clus-
ters. The PIP layer provides role based routing
service between nodes belonging to connected
clusters. Each node advertises their specific
roles. The forwarding table of PIP maintains
entries mapping routes to specific roles and an
associated cost metric. Thus, PIP provides an
abstract view of a fully connected cluster of
nodes to the upper layers while managing all
the heterogeneity of access technologies, role
based naming of nodes, and energy efficient
neighbor and resource discovery mechanisms
within itself.
2. Phoenix Transport Protocol (PTP): DAN op-
erates in an environment of intermittent con-
nectivity, like DTNs. Also, negotiation based
control signaling to optimize bandwidth uti-
lization is not possible in such scenarios. Thus,
the Phoenix Transport Layer (PTP) is respon-
sible for optimization of storage resources to
guarantee eventual delivery of the message.
This “store and forward” paradigm of Phoenix
is pretty similar to DTNs except that in DANs
like Phoenix, storage resources are highly con-
strained and congestion control issues are more
important in DANs than in other types of
DTNs. In an attempt to optimize storage re-
sources at forwarding nodes, PTP follows strict
prioritization in data forwarding during con-
tact opportunities.
To deliver data between PTP neighbors (logi-
cally connected nodes, similar to the concept of
neighbors in the end-to-end paradigm) belong-
ing to the same connected cluster, PIP rout-
ing may be used. However, for PTP neighbors
in disconnected clusters, opportunistic dissem-
ination techniques need to be used. PTP tries
to optimize this dissemination process through
“selective dissemination” – deciding what data
to be given to whom to maximize the eventual
delivery probability of the data. However, lack
of pre-estimated knowledge about node mobil-
ity and capability make it challenging for PTP
to optimize selective dissemination. A mecha-
nism of diffusion filters based on exchange of
context information (neighbors encountered in
a time window, current neighbors, degree of
connectivity of nodes etc.) between PTP peers
has been suggested as a solution for such situ-
ations.
Other architectural considerations of Phoenix
include those of security, role management, con-
text sensing and localization, and accounting and
anomaly detection issues.
Phoenix is, thus, an instantiation of a more gen-
eral class of disaster Day After Networks (DAN),
that is expected to use established concepts and
techniques of DTNs and spawn an important re-
search area for future networking research.
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5.5. Selectively Connected Networking (SCN)
Most future system designs will need to be
energy-efficient. Networking systems are no excep-
tion. The original design of the Internet assumed
an “always-on” mode for every architectural ele-
ment of the system –routers, switches, end hosts
etc. Sleep-modes defined in modern operating sys-
tems are capable preserving the local state of the
end-hosts, but not their network states. This in-
capability can be attributed to the design of the
networking protocols. Most protocols implicitly as-
sume the prolonged non-responsiveness from a par-
ticular end-host to be signs of a failure and thus
discard all associated communication state with the
end-host. Obviously, a new paradigm of energy ef-
ficient protocol design is required to design energy
efficient networking systems.
Methods for developing a “selectively connected”
energy efficient network architecture are proposed
for study by [2]. Although not particularly simi-
lar to DTNs, research in designing selectively con-
nected systems could benefit from the existing ideas
in DTN’s, particularly when sleep modes of end
hosts render an environment of intermittent con-
nectivity. The key ideas in the design of selectively
connected systems are: (1) Delegation of proxy-able
state to assistants that help the end system to sleep,
(2) Policy specifications by the end system to be
able to specify particular events for which it should
be woken, (3) defining application primitives allow-
ing the assistant to participate in the application
(e.g., peer-to-peer searches) on behalf of the host
and wake up the host only when required, and (4)
Developing security mechanisms to prevent unau-
thorized access to the systems state from its pat-
terns of communication.
The delegation of proxy-able state to the assis-
tant and also delegating application responsibilities
to it on behalf of the host bear some resemblance
to the transfer of custody transfer mechanisms of
DTN’s. Nonetheless, custody transfer has the im-
plication of defining a paradigm wherein end-to-end
principle is not strictly adhered to while it seems
that the assistant mechanism simply acts as a proxy
for the host for control messages of distributed pro-
tocols (thus maintaining selective connectivity) and
is authorized to wake up the host whenever actual
end-to-end data communication is required. We be-
lieve that the design of assistants can be further ex-
tended using the concepts of custody transfer and
store-and-forward networks such as DTN’s.
6. Network Monitoring and Control Archi-
tectures
The Internet is a massive distributed system.
The success of the Internet can largely be at-
tributed to the superiority of the distributed algo-
rithms that could handle the scale-up of the In-
ternet from a modest research and academic net-
work to its present global commercial entity. How-
ever, with the commercialization of the Internet,
vested economic, political and social interests of
the multiple ownership network model have added
huge complexities to the elegance and simplicity of
the distributed algorithms that were not designed
under such constraints. Retrofitting policies into
the control plane of distributed algorithms made
them complex and often led to instabilities. Sim-
ilarly, the management plane of the Internet was
never explicitly designed. Management of a single
owner, all trusted network of a few hundred hosts
did not pose the requirement of a separate manage-
ment plane. With the scale-up of the Internet to
its current size, management is no longer a trivial
task.
Another design weakness of the current Internet
is that the management and control plane ride on
the data plane. This creates, (1) security concerns
wherein any misbehaving or compromised entity
may send out unauthorized management or control
packets and jeopardize any network function, (2)
bootstrapping problem wherein the network cannot
self-configure itself, thus depending on manual con-
figurations for initial boot up of the network, and
(3) Poor failure mode operation [51] wherein the
management protocols are un-available when they
are most required - during failures.
In this section we discuss some of the clean-slate
architectural ideas that have been proposed to al-
leviate the above anomalies in the current Inter-
net architecture. Also, some novel proposals aiding
network trouble shooting and debugging are also
discussed.
6.1. 4D Architecture
The 4D architecture [135, 186, 50, 153, 51]
presents a complete grounds up re-design of the In-
ternet management and control planes. It proposes
the paradigm shift from the current “box centric”
management and control to a completely central-
ized solution. The 4D architecture mostly addresses
the routing related management issues and those
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that apply to management and control within an
autonomous system.
Every autonomous system (AS) of the Internet
is bound by some common local policies. Most
of these policies are related to routing and access
related functions. However, such centralized poli-
cies have to be translated to “box-level” policies,
wherein a box may be a host, internal router, bor-
der router or other network entity within the AS.
These “box-level” policies have to be deployed in-
dividually (and hence a box-centric approach) such
that they aggregately implement the network-wide
policy of the AS. The disadvantages of such an ap-
proach are:
1. Manual configurations at each network entity
are error prone and complex. Also, manual
configurations do not scale well for large net-
works.
2. The routing protocols are not designed to com-
prehend any policy language. The only way
to implement a policy is by changing the in-
put parameters (such as local preference, link
weights, DER etc) of the protocols to drive a
desired output (Forwarding Information Base
etc).
3. Changes in network topology (link failure, ad-
dition of a router, planned outages) require
manual reconfigurations in accordance with
the new context.
Apart from these, network trouble shooting, de-
bugging, problem isolation etc are extremely com-
plicated for large enterprise networks. Problems in
the data plane cannot be addressed through a man-
agement plane (when it is most required) because
the management plane typically rides over the data
plane itself. Lack of proper interface for coopera-
tion of distributed algorithms, for example between
inter-domain and intra-domain routing protocols,
lead to instabilities.
Figure 5 further illustrates the motivation behind
the 4D architecture. Fig. 5 presents a simple enter-
prise scenario, wherein AF1 and BF1 are the front
office hosts of an enterprise while AD1 and BD1 are
the data centers. The enterprise level policy allows
front office hosts to access each other (AF1 may ac-
cess BF1 and vice versa) but allows only local ac-
cess for the data centers (AF1 can access AD1 and
not BD1). To implement this policy, the routers
at R1 and R3 place packet filters at the interfaces
i1.1 and i3.1 respectively to prevent any non-local
packets to have access to the data centre. Now,
suppose a redundant or backup link is added be-
tween the routers R1 and R3. Such a small change,
requires positioning of additional packet filters at
interfaces i1.2 and i3.2 of routers R1 and R3 re-
spectively. However, such packet filters prevent the
flow of packets between AF1 and BF1 through R2-
R1-R3-R4, in case of failure of the link between R2
and R4, even though a backup route exists.
Figure 5: A Management Mis-configuration Scenario
The four D’s of the 4D architecture are: Data,
Discovery, Dissemination and Decision. These four
planes are related to each other as shown in Fig. 6
to define a “centralized control” architecture based
on “network wide views” (view of the whole net-
work) to be able to dictate “direct control” over
the various distributed entities for meeting “net-
work level objectives” of policy enforcements. The
individual functions of each plane in the four di-
mensional structure are as follows:
1. Discovery Plane: Responsible for automatic
discovery of the network entities. Involves box
level discoveries – router characteristics, neigh-
bor discovery, link layer discovery- link charac-
teristics. The Discovery plane is responsible for
creating the “network level views”.
2. Dissemination Plane: Based on the discovery
plane data a dissemination channel is created
between each network node and the Decision
elements.
3. Decision Plane: The centralized decision el-
ements form the decision plane. This plane
computes individual network entity state (e.g.,
routing tables for routers etc.) based on the
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view of the whole network topology and net-
work level policies to be enforced.
4. Data Plane: The data plane is responsible for
handling individual packets and process them
according to the state that has been output by
the decision plane. This state may be the rout-
ing tables, placement of packet filters, tunnel
configurations, address translations etc.
Figure 6: 4D Architecture
Thus, the 4D architecture sets up a separate dis-
semination channel for control and management
activities through link layer self discovery mecha-
nisms. This gets rid of the management and control
plane bootstrapping problem and makes a basis for
auto or self configurable networks. The centralized
Decision elements are responsible for implementing
dynamic configurations based on topology informa-
tion and organizational policy inputs. As an ex-
ample, in the case study presented in Fig. 6, the
change in the network topology as a result of the
additional link between R1 and R3 is discovered
by the discovery plane. The change is communi-
cated to the decision plane through the dissemina-
tion channel. The decision plane re-evaluates the
configuration of the network and places additional
filters to conform to the organizational policies.
The ideas of centralized control and management
have been here for some time. [37] suggests a rout-
ing architecture wherein the routers act like for-
warders while the computation of routing tables is
done centrally. Also, the Routing Control Platform
(RCP) [20], may be considered to be an implemen-
tation of some of the ideas of the 4D architecture.
RCP proposes a similar idea of computing routing
tables centrally based on data from border routers
and eventually having two RCP enabled sites ex-
changing inter-domain routing information directly
between the RCP servers.
The centralized solution though attractive may
have some pitfalls in terms of scalability. An imme-
diate scalability concern with respect to the 4D ar-
chitecture is the discovery and dissemination plane.
The discovery and dissemination plane depends on
network wide broadcasts. Broadcast mechanisms
are essential for discovery mechanisms that do not
depend on manual configuration. However, for
large networks, a huge broadcast domain may pose
to be bottleneck in performance. In this regard, the
4D architecture may borrow some ideas from [63],
which implements an Ethernet architecture using
DHT based lookup mechanism instead of network
wide flooding.
6.2. Complexity Oblivious Network Management
(CONMan)
The CONMan architecture [42] is an extension
of the 4D architecture. It re-uses the discovery and
dissemination mechanisms of 4D and extends the
4D management channel to accommodate multi-
ple decision elements or Network Managers. Each
network manager in CONMan may be associated
with particular network management tasks. In this
regard, CONMan takes a more general outlook of
management than 4D, not restricting it to just rout-
ing related management. Also, unlike 4D, CON-
Man does not present an extreme design point of
completely doing away with distributed algorithms
such as routing.
The motivations of CONMan are similar to those
of 4D. The objectives of CONMan are: (1) Self
Configuration, (2) Continual validation, (3) Reg-
ular abstraction, and (4) Declarative Specification.
Self configuring networks are dynamic, adaptable
and also less prone to errors because of reduced
human intervention. Continual validation ensures
that the networks configuration satisfies the stated
objectives. Regular Abstraction requires data plane
distributed algorithms to implement a standardized
abstract management interface through which they
can be managed. Declarative specification is the
ability to declare network objectives in high level
abstract terms and define an automated method to
convert these high-level objectives to low-level im-
plementations.
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Based on the objectives stated above, CON-
Man implements an architecture based on discov-
ery and dissemination planes, module abstractions
and pipes. While the discovery and dissemination
planes bear close resemblance to that of the 4D ar-
chitectures, module abstractions are the primitive
building blocks that implement a network wide ob-
jective. Network wide objectives are modeled as a
graph of interconnected modules spread across var-
ious nodes in the network. These modules may be
data plane modules (TCP,IP etc) or control plane
modules (IKE, routing, etc.), on the same network
node or different network nodes strung together
using pipes. The module abstraction thus model
relationships such as dependencies, peering, com-
munication etc. Pipes connect modules and hide
the complexity of the mechanisms needed to con-
nect the modules which may vary from inter-process
communications, socket based connections etc.
Figure 7: CONMan: Module Abstraction and Dependency
Graph
Fig. 7 shows an example of module abstraction
and presents a scenario for the implementation of
secure IPSec based communication. In the figure,
the IP-Sec module delivers data over the IP module
which in turn uses the ETH module. The IP-Sec
module is also dependant on the Internet Key Ex-
change (IKE) protocol module to set up end-to-end
secure keys for a session. Similarly the IKE module
uses the UDP module over the IP module to estab-
lish end-to-end keys which it returns to the IP-Sec
module. Fig. 7 is a abstract view of the module
design in which each module has a switching func-
tion that allows it to pass packets between up-pipe
(connecting to modules above it in the same node)
and down-pipes (connecting to modules below it in
the same node). The switching state may be pro-
duced locally through the protocol action or may be
provided externally through a network manager.
This modular view is very similar to an UML
based system design, defining a system as an aggre-
gation of distributed and interconnected function,
differing, however, in the fact that it has been opti-
mized to define highly dynamic systems that require
continual validation and re-configuration of the sys-
tem through a centralized authority. Thus, CON-
Man takes a less extreme measure than 4D by cen-
tralizing the configurability of the network at the
granularity of module interactions rather than cen-
tralizing the whole control and management plane.
6.3. Maestro
Maestro [32] proposes an operating system like
approach for network control and management.
In such architecture, network controls are imple-
mented as applications over an operating environ-
ment. The operating environment provides sup-
port to the network control applications much in
the same way an operating system provides sup-
port to the applications, by providing services such
as, (1) scheduling, (2) synchronization, (3) inter-
application communication, and (4) resource mul-
tiplexing.
Maestro also proposes a clean-slate architecture
and advocates the need to provide clear abstrac-
tions and interfaces between protocols, in the same
spirit as that of 4D or CONMan. However, unlike
4D or CONMan, Maestro proposes implementing
an explicit protection mechanism through defining
network-wide invariants in the face of control mech-
anisms. This provides an extra cushion against any
configuration errors, right from high-level configu-
ration description to their lower-level implementa-
tion.
A high-level view of the Maestro architecture is
shown in Fig. 8. Maestro uses a Meta-Management
System (MMS) channel which is similar to the dis-
semination channel of the 4D architecture. Also,
just like the discovery mechanism of 4D, Maestro
collects topology and other information of the un-
derlying network over the MMS channel. The oper-
ating platform uses this data to construct a virtual
view for control applications running on top of it.
Each application is provided with the specific and
relevant view of the network that it needs to see.
As an example, QoS routing application is not
presented with the routers B3, B4, and A4 by
the virtual view layer since they are relevant for
the QoS routing computations. Similarly, suppose
inter-domain policy necessitates the need to prevent
B2 from being the egress router for ISPX. To imple-
ment such a policy, the virtual view provides a view
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Figure 8: Maestro Architecture
to the shortest path routing application devoid of
the information that B2 is a border router.
Hence, while the 4D architecture treats the con-
trol and management functions as one single mono-
lithic entity, Maestro treats them as an aggregate of
multiple functions, with an operating environment
and network-level invariants ensuring synchroniza-
tion among the functions and validating their out-
puts.
6.4. Autonomic Network Management
In 2001, IBM presented a holistic vision for au-
tonomic computing in which the system as a whole
would attain a higher degree of automation than
simply the sum of its self-managed parts [136].
Based on this motivation, the Autonomic Net-
work Architecture (ANA) project [137] is a clean-
slate meta-architecture for the next generation net-
works. The key objectives of ANA are similar to
those of the self-* properties of an autonomous sys-
tem stated in [136]. However, pertaining specifi-
cally to an autonomic network architecture, ANA
motivates a networking architecture composed of
self-configuring nodes, self-organizing into a net-
work system through neighbor interactions, with
multiple such systems self-federating into a hetero-
geneous Internetwork. Apart from these, the net-
working systems should possess the properties of
self-protection and self healing.
The ANA framework which allows the co-
existence of multiple heterogeneous systems are
composed of “compartments”. Compartments are
similar to the idea of realms [143], except that
rather than simply managing its own private ad-
dress space, compartment membership entails be-
ing “able, willing and permitted to communicate
to each other according to compartment wide pol-
icy and protocols”. Every compartment has a hy-
pothetical database that stores the information of
each member. Before being able to communicate
with any member of the compartment, a resolution
process is required to access the database to find the
way to access the member. Additionally, address-
ing is done through local identifiers called labels. To
communicate with a remote peer, the sender sends
the packet with a local label. This local label iden-
tifies and “Information Dispatch Point” (IDP) to
which a “channel” is bound. The “channel” is an
abstraction of the path setup as a result of the res-
olution process.
Additionally, functional blocks that are entities
like packet processors can be inserted into the data
path on demand. Using these, ANA provides mul-
tiple mechanisms to do a network operation by run-
time selection and switching of protocols. Thus
functional composition and monitoring allows ANA
to implement its self-* properties.
Although the ANA architecture does not define
a specific method for network control and manage-
ment, we include it in this section since we believe
autonomic systems and their self-* properties define
a new paradigm of management and control archi-
tectures and have the potential to be the basis for
the next generation networking architectures..
A holistic framework for autonomic network
management based on ubiquitous instrumentation
is proposed in [137]. The way protocols are built to-
day, with measurement being just an add-on func-
tion, the future network protocols need to be built
around a well engineered instrumentation mecha-
nism. Based on data from these measurements, lo-
cal and global policies and mechanisms for global
data sharing, the task of global decision making
may be automated depending on centralized or dis-
tributed management paradigm.
6.5. In-Network Management (INM)
While ANA is a generic architectural framework
for autonomic systems composed of autonomic de-
vices, In-Network Management (INM) [41, 29, 47]
proposes a more specific architectural design for
embedding management capabilities in all network
entities and leveraging the management capabili-
ties that can be achieved as a result of their col-
laboration . Thus INM advocates a paradigm of
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management service composition using several au-
tonomous components. Also, in this regard, INM
is quite different from the centralized architectures
of 4D, CONMan and Maestro.
In INM, management functionalities are embed-
ded into every network node. Different levels of
embedding management capabilities into functional
components (device drivers, network protocols etc)
are defined: (1) Inherent: Management capabil-
ity inseparable from the logic of the logic of the
component (TCP congestion control), (2) Inte-
grated: Management capability internal to a func-
tional component but separable from the compo-
nent logic, and (3)External: Management capa-
bility located on another node.
Fig. 9 shows a high level view of the INM node
architecture. The InNetMgmt Runtime environ-
ment is the container in which functional compo-
nents and In-NetMgmt services can run. The In-
NetMgmt Packages, InNetMgmt framework and In-
Netmgmt platform are the different levels of ab-
stractions of management function primitives. The
InNetMgmt platform provides the most primitive
capabilities that can be enabled on a wide set of
devices. InNetMgmt framework provides primitive
capabilities for a narrower set of devices and the
InNetMgmt packages provide technology specific
functional add-ons. Functional components are log-
ical entities inside a node that may have their own
management capabilities or may be entities that
compose a management functionality. The InNet-
Mgmt Services are specific utilities that can be used
by management applications. Example such util-
ity is a command mediation service which allows
management applications to issue commands and
receive responses from the functional components.
Figure 9: INM Architecture
Fig. 10 shows the generic design of a functional
component for INM. Functional components may
have their own management modules with a well-
defined management interface. The management
interface allows functional components to exchange
management information. Also, every component
needs to have a service interface through which it
can expose domain specific functionality and a su-
pervision interface through which the framework
may manage and monitor the component.
Figure 10: INM: Functional Component
Having discussed the node architecture and the
component architecture, we now present an overall
architecture of INM in Fig. 11.
A network administrator can connect using an
INM application (point of attachment) connected
to the INM kernel. Instead of using a centralized
policy server to disseminate and enforce policies on
every node, INM allows the policies to be deployed
on any node and passed on to others using a P2P
mechanism implemented as a component.
We suppose that the INM design would be highly
scalable compared to centralized solutions. How-
ever, there is some inherent complexity in defining
abstract generic interfaces and also in converting
network-wide policies into a distributed manage-
ment state.
To summarize, in this section, we discussed some
Figure 11: INM: Functional Component + Configuration
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of the leading proposals for management and con-
trol architectures for the next generation Internet.
The ideas varied from being extreme design points
proposing a completely centralized design in 4D to
much milder distributed designs of ANA and INM.
Also, it seems that the research community shall
have to reach a consensus on whether management
and control functionality should be stripped away
from protocols and established as a separate ser-
vice or whether it should still continue to exist as
part of protocols. However, there seems to be some
unity of thought in the fact that protocols need to
implement generic management interfaces through
which a network entity may communicate manage-
ment information and decisions with other entities
in the network, be it a central policy server dissem-
inating specific state information or network peers
communicating local policy.
7. Services Architecture
The commercial usage of Internet, ubiquitous
and heterogeneous environments, new communi-
cation abstraction, and security and management
challenges require the next generation Internet to
provide a broad range of services that go far be-
yond the simple store-and-forward paradigm of the
today’s Internet. Research efforts focusing on defin-
ing a new service architecture for the next gener-
ation Internet are motivated by the following re-
quirements: (1) how the architecture can be flexi-
ble and adaptive, (2) how to avoid the ossification
of the current Internet, and (3) how to map the
user-level service requirements into the lower lay-
ers such as infrastructure layer’s implementation.
FIND projects on service architecture are relatively
more technical or detailed, meaning that they try
to make the service implementation easier and more
flexible, though through different ways: (1) Service-
Centric End-to-End Abstractions for Network Ar-
chitecture: put application function to the routers
(service-centric abstraction), (2) SILO: divide into
flexible services and methods across the whole net-
works, and support cross layer, and (3) NetServ:
self-virtualized in lower layers, put service to IP
layer. In comparison, the EU FP7 projects are
more concerned about the relationship among dif-
ferent interested parties and how to setup the ser-
vice agreement and achieve the service integration
from business level to infrastructure level.
7.1. Service-Centric End-to-End Abstractions for
Network Architecture
The traditional end-to-end based Internet design
puts almost all the service intelligence into the end-
hosts or servers, while the network only performs
hop-by-hop packet forwarding. The network pro-
cessing is performed at no higher than the network
layer. The network function of packet forward-
ing was oblivious to the end-to-end service require-
ments with the network providing a single class
best effort service to all end-to-end service flows.
This purposeful design is the basis of the simplic-
ity underlying the current Internet architecture and
was suitable in the context under which it was de-
signed. However, commercialization of the Inter-
net introduced diverse end-to-end service require-
ments, requiring more diversified network services.
The Service-Centric End-to-End Abstractions for
Network Architecture [159] seeks to define a new
service architectural framework for the next gener-
ation Internet. The idea is to develop the communi-
cation abstraction around the transfer of informa-
tion rather than the transfer of data. Information
is at a higher level of abstraction than data and the
basic task of the network should be transferring in-
formation rather than just data packets. Packets
by themselves are just parts of the representation
of information. This new abstraction idea is called
Information Transfer and Data Service (ITDS).
The other key idea of this solution is that it uti-
lizes network-process-based routers as infrastruc-
ture components. These routers will have to be
aware of the application layer service information
rendering the network to be an integral part of the
service architecture rather than just a store-forward
functionality. Fig. 12 and 13 present a comparison
of the network stacks between the current Internet
and the one with the new ITDS idea.
Figure 12: Layered Internet Architecture[159]
Based on the ITDS abstraction, some example
scenarios of the data services are shown in Fig. 14,
15 and 16. A reliable and private communication
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Figure 13: Information Transfer and Data Services Architec-
ture [159]
scenario is presented in Fig. 14. It consists of two
data services implementing reliability and privacy
functionality. The combination of the services can
then be applied to the other types of point-to-point
information transfer. Fig. 15 presents a scenario of
combining a caching service with a reliability ser-
vice. Different end-hosts then can use the same
caching service. This combinational service can be
applied to conventional point-to-point caching ser-
vice. The scenario in Fig. 16 shows a multicast
service which could include a large number of end-
systems. Moreover, different end-systems can have
content trans-coding operation to adapt the presen-
tation of the information to be transferred.
Figure 14: Reliable and Private Communication [159]
Figure 15: Web Caching [159]
In such a framework, it is important to decide
where to assign the processing task across the In-
ternet entities. This is also known as the service
mapping problem. The service placement across
the network is shown in Fig. 17.
The mapping requirements are almost on every
layer of the system such as end-to-end layer, router
layer, or even port processors layer. However, this
mapping problem is known to be NP-complete.
This service architecture basically changes the
conventional end-to-end assumption underlying the
Figure 16: Content Distribution and Trans-coding [159]
Figure 17: Service Mapping [159]
current Internet and advocates on putting more
functionality into routers, besides their general
store-and-forwarding functionality. The architec-
ture requires application layer processing capabil-
ities throughout the network, including the end-
systems as well as the routers. Thus, the feasibility
of such a requirement of the routers remains to be
validated.
Secondly, the service mapping won’t be an easy
problem, that is to say, deciding how much capac-
ities to invest into general purpose processing and
how much for service processing will be an impor-
tant issue, which requires a good heuristic solution
easy and efficient enough for the future. This prob-
lem is known to be NP-complete and will be tackled
by exploring different heuristics. It is also necessary
to consider how different processing functions can
be controlled from the point of view of the network
as well as the end-system.
7.2. SILO Architecture for Services Integration,
Control, and Optimization for the Future In-
ternet
The current Internet is facing the so-called
“Balkanization” problem because the new emerg-
ing networks and protocols do not necessarily share
27
the same common goals or purpose as the initial
Internet.
The SILO architecture [165] presents a non-
layered inter-networking framework. The basic
idea is that complex communication tasks can be
achieved by dynamically combining a series of ele-
mental functional blocks to form a specific service.
That is to say, it can break the general strict layered
model and form a more flexible model for construct-
ing new services. Because of this flexibility, it is also
easier to do the cross-layer design which is difficult
to be done in the current Internet architecture.
The design goals include: (1) Supports for a scal-
able unified architecture, (2) Cross-service interac-
tion, and (3) Flexible and extensible services inte-
gration.
Figure 18: SILO Architecture [165]
In SILO, services are the fundamental building
blocks. A service is a self-contained function per-
formed on application data such as: “end-to-end
flow control”, “in-order packet delivery”, “compres-
sion”, and “encryption”. Each service is an atomic
function focusing on providing specific function.
These small services can be selected to construct
a particular task, but the order of these services
do not necessary obeys the conventional “layer” se-
quence and can embrace a much more flexible prece-
dence constraints.
Different from service, method is an implemen-
tation of a service that uses a specific mechanism
to realize the functionality associated with the ser-
vice. An ordered subset of methods within which
each method implements a different service is called
a silo. A silo is a vertical stack of methods and a
silo performs a set of transformation on data from
the application layer down to the network or infras-
tructure layer. Control agent is the entity inside a
node which is in charge of constructing a silo for
an application and adjusting service or method pa-
rameters to facilitate the cross-service interaction.
In SILO architecture, for each new connection, a
silo is built dynamically by the control agent. The
basic architecture and their components relation-
ship is shown in Fig. 18. The cloud is the universe
of services which consists of services represented by
circles. Multiple methods can be used to implement
the same service inside every circle. Solid arrow
means the sequence constraints of constructing the
service. Control agent interacts with all elements
and constructs silos according to the precedence.
Figure 19: SILO examples: (a) TCP/IP emulation (b)
MPEG video transmission over wireless [165]
From Fig. 19 we can see that one of the biggest
advantages of SILO is that it blurs the distinction
between core and edge entities, and each network
node is free to implement any service. Moreover,
the modularity of services, different protocols for
the same layer and different implementations of the
protocol can be “plugged in and out” easily. Be-
cause of this, the fine grained cross layer design
naturally becomes very easy and efficient.
However, because the design is significantly dif-
ferent from the current Internet, one of the biggest
puzzles is that it is not easy to be validated or
implemented. It is also important and difficult to
define and identify the appropriate building block
services. Moreover, the cross layer design is always
related with optimizations, it remains a future re-
search topic for this issue. The control functionality
of the system is also important for efficiency. Fur-
ther control optimization related research may be
needed.
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7.3. NetSerV: Architecture of a Service-Virtualized
Internet
It is well known that the current Internet archi-
tecture is resistant against adding new functionality
and services to the network core, which is also called
“ossification” problem. Adding new network ser-
vice is not as easy as adding new application to the
end-points. Two typical examples are the failure of
broad scale implementation of the multicast rout-
ing and QoS, and more and more network services
are implemented by using overlay network. How-
ever, overlay network operate at the application-
layer and it is hard to effectively use the resources in
the other layers. For example, the overlay networks
use their own routing tables and routing algorithms
to do the overlay routing.
The NetServ project [84] aims to develop effi-
cient and extensible service architecture in the core
network to overcome the ossification. As shown in
Fig. 20, it tries to break up the functionalities of
the Internet services and makes individual building
blocks to construct network services. Each building
block is a single unit of network resource or function
such as linking monitoring data or routing tables
that can further be used or assembled by the upper
layer function. This structure can be hosted on any
network node such as a router or some dedicated
servers. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 21, network
service can run over one or more nodes offering the
building blocks and the services can run on a “virtu-
alized services” framework which consists of a group
of building blocks operating individually.
Figure 20: NetSerV:Transition to a New Internet Service
Architecture
The idea of breaking the basic functionalities into
building blocks eases the flexibilities of assembling
upper-layer services and adding new functionalities
into the architecture. However, it also means signif-
icant changes to the current layered structure of the
network stack. It will also be a challenge to prove
Figure 21: NetSerV: Visrtual Service Framework
that the changed model or structure can offer better
or similar efficiency and reliability for the current
functions such as routing and data delivery. Funda-
mental changes to the network stack always means
risks and also new potential security holes which
need further observation and evaluation. Moreover,
how to build the building blocks and how to divide
them into different group (or how to do the ab-
straction of the basic functions), and even how to
make them interact - all remains to be solved. The
protocols and mechanisms for service discovery and
service distribution are also important issues.
7.4. SLA@SOI: Empowering the Service Economy
with SLA-aware Infrastructures
SLA@SOI means Service Level Agreements
(SLAs) within a service-oriented infrastructure
(SOI) [166]. Different from the former discussed
service architecture research project of FIND which
focus more relatively on “singular” network stack
modification, the SLA@SOI from EU is more about
“multiple” ideas of future Service Oriented Infras-
tructure. Specifically, its goal is to realize the vi-
sion of dynamic service provisioning by a SLA man-
agement framework in multi-level environment, i.e.,
scenarios involving multiple stakeholders and layers
of business/IT stack. To realize dynamic service
provisioning, there are three challenges that must
be addressed:
1. Predictability and dependability of the quality
of services
2. SLA management be transparently managed
across the whole network
3. Support highly automatic and dynamic negoti-
ation, provision, delivery, and monitoring ser-
vices.
Thus the main goal of SLA@SOI is to provide
an SLA management framework allowing consistent
management and specification of SLAs in a multi-
level environment. The main innovations include:
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1. SLA management framework
2. Adaptive SLA-aware infrastructure
3. Business management and engineering method
for predictable system
The SLA@SOI architecture is focused on the ser-
vice relationship setup and maintenance between
customer, service provider, infrastructure provider,
and software provider. It is trying to set up a
high-level business relationship or framework, busi-
ness perspective framework to facilitate the service
deployment or implementation from business level
down to the infrastructure level. Fig. 22 offers a
simple overview of the SLA management process.
In today’s layered system, it is not easy to map
user-level SLA into physical infrastructure. Thus,
in Fig. 22, we can see that SLA@SOI includes
the mapping of higher-level SLA requirement onto
lower levels and the aggregation of low-level capa-
bilities to higher levels. The vertical information
flow basically reflects the service interdependencies
and the originating business context, and support
proxy and negotiation process at each layer.
Figure 22: Overview of the Automatic SLA Management
Process
The biggest advantage of SLA@SOI is to set up
an inter-party service level agreement framework
in multi-level environment between different par-
ties such as customer, software provider, service
provider, and infrastructure provider. Unlike other
research projects in FIND which are more about
long term research rather than short term industry
need, SLA@SOI provides a more high-level archi-
tecture for the service deployment and implemen-
tation in real business environment. However, we
can also notice that it is not easy to set up a sim-
ple framework and ask all the different parties to
obey, and it could take more time and effort be-
yond the technical aspect to realize this goal. More-
over, the realization of the high-level service level
agreement also needs detailed technical support like
other FIND projects which are researching to apply
the user-level requirements to the infrastructure.
7.5. SOA4All: Service Oriented Architectures for
All
SOA4ALL stands for the Service Oriented Archi-
tecture for All [168]. SOA4All is endorsed by the
Networked European Software and Services Initia-
tive (NESSI) [83].
SOA4ALL aims at providing a comprehensive
framework that integrates four complementary
and evolutionary technical advances (SOA, context
management, web principles, Web 2.0 and semantic
technologies) into a coherent and domain indepen-
dent service delivery platform.
The overall architecture of SOA4ALL includes
four parts: SOA4ALL Studio, Distributed Service
Bus, SOA4ALL Platform Service, and Business Ser-
vices (third party Web services and light-weight
processes), as shown in Fig. 23.
Figure 23: SOA4ALL Architecture [165]
In the center of the architecture is the SOA4ALL
Distributed Service Bus which serves as infrastruc-
ture service and core integration platform. The Dis-
tributed Service Bus delivers the necessary exten-
sion and developments towards a large scale, open,
distributed and web-scale computing environment.
The SOA4ALL Studio delivers a web-based user
front-end that enables the creation, provisioning,
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consumption and analysis of the platform services
and various third party business services that are
published to SOA4ALL. The Studio supports dif-
ferent types of users at different times of interac-
tion. The platform services deliver service discov-
ery, ranking and selection, composition and invoca-
tion functionality, respectively. These services are
usable as any other published service in the archi-
tecture. Their functionalities are used by the Studio
to offer client requested functionalities. In Fig. 23,
the other parts are business services and processes
which are created and processed by the SOA4ALL
infrastructure.
SOA4ALL tries to integrate the most recent and
advanced technologies into a comprehensive frame-
work and infrastructure to provide an efficient web
of billions of services. Research challenges for
SOA4ALL include the openness of the future web
communities and whether the openness and mobil-
ity will pave the way towards a real explosion on
the web.
8. Next Generation Routing Architectures
The current state-of-art of Internet routing is
marred with numerous problems. The biggest and
most immediate concern is that of scalability. With
the huge growth in network-able devices partici-
pating in the Internet, the routing infrastructure
is finding it difficult to provide unique locators to
each of these devices (address depletion problem)
and the routing nodes are unable to cope with the
exponential growth in routing table sizes, number
of update messages and churn due to dynamic na-
ture of networks [80]. The basic advantage of packet
switched networks in providing higher resilience is
hardly implemented in practice. Apart from these,
basic services such as mobility, quality of service,
multicasting, policy enforcements and security are
extremely hard to be realized, if at all. New inno-
vations proposed to mitigate some of the ills have
hardly seen any wide-scale deployment. These and
other weaknesses of the routing mechanism in the
current Internet have resulted in a spur of activity
trying to design a better routing architecture for
the next generation Internet. While some of the
schemes are clean-slate, thus requiring a complete
architectural overhaul, others are more incremental
that can be implemented over the present underly-
ing system to procure partial benefits. In this sec-
tion, we discuss some of these proposals that have
the potential to change the routing architecture of
the future Internet.
8.1. Algorithmic Foundations for Internet Archi-
tecture: Clean Slate Approach
Leveraging the advances in algorithmic theory
since the time the current routing model of the In-
ternet was developed, [10] advocates a fresh look
at the algorithmic basis of the current routing pro-
tocols. A simple example to justify this claim lies
in the inability of the current routing protocols to
route around congestion. The current routing is
based on static load insensitive metric that does not
adapt dynamically to avoid congested paths. The
proposed solution to this problem led to a “tragedy
of the commons” condition wherein all the flows
greedily try to route through the least congested
path resulting in the routing protocol acting as its
own adversary and causing wasteful oscillations of
flows across sub-optimal paths. Also, the routing
model is based on the assumption of “blind trust”
where the routing system is not robust in itself but
depends on the absence of intelligent adversaries,
huge over-provisioning and manual interventions.
Proposals to secure routing assume the presence
of trusted anchors for policing and authentication,
avoiding the hard condition of compromised trust
anchors.
A fundamental requirement to overcome the
weakness of the current routing protocols is to de-
fine a new routing metric that can dynamically
adapt itself to congestions and attacks by a Byzan-
tine insider, provide incentives for selfish users, and
guarantee QoS through effective and efficient shar-
ing of heterogeneous resources. The selection of
such a dynamic adaptable metric entails changes in
the hierarchical IP based path computation meth-
ods. A new scalable path computation mechanism,
in the lines of flexible peer-to-peer routing architec-
tures, that can be mapped to this underlying metric
needs to be determined. Also, the new metric and
the path computation mechanism should be able
to accommodate the future requirements of content
based routing.
A proposed economics-inspired metric with all
the desired property is called the “opportunity
cost” price function. The idea is to attach a cost
to each resource (node memory, node bandwidth,
CPU processing, etc.) such that an un-utilized re-
source is available at “zero” cost, with the cost be-
coming higher for a higher utilized resource. An
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application requiring such a resource needs to jus-
tify the cost of the resource against the benefit of
acquiring it forming the basis of an effective QoS
framework. An application is allowed to specify an
arbitrary “benefit” per unit of flow. The QoS ad-
mission control and routing is done by finding the
shortest path in the opportunity metric and com-
paring this cost to the benefit of the flow. If the
benefit of the flow is more than the opportunity
cost of the path, the flow is admitted. This mecha-
nism warrants selfish applications reporting higher
benefits to grab more resources for their flows. Such
a condition is avoided through an incentive mech-
anism that assigns a fixed budget of opportunity
cost to an application.
Having defined the metric, the routing mech-
anism needs to be made secure against insider
Byzantine attacks. Greedy methods of path selec-
tion based on past history fail to counter dynamic
adversaries that follow a specific attack pattern
matching the greedy path selection. Such adaptive
or dynamic adversaries need not be a third party
attacker. But the routing system itself, owing to
the weakness of its algorithmic basis, acts as its
own adaptive adversary under the “tragedy of com-
mons” situation. A simple algorithm to counter
such a situation involves the adaptive metric which
keeps track of the losses encountered across each
edge and selecting a path probabilistically such that
the probability of selecting a path grows exponen-
tially with the past losses in that path. To avoid the
“tragedy of commons” situation in adaptive routing
to counter congested paths, a mechanism wherein
the routers artificially suppress the acknowledge-
ments based on a probability dependant on the cur-
rent congestion condition is devised. These artifi-
cial suppression of acknowledgements feed the loss
metric view of the network for each flow that try
to route along the least cost path over this met-
ric based on a novel flow control mechanism that
adaptively re-routes the flows.
The dynamic metric discussed thus far needs to
be supported over large network topologies in a
scalable manner. The topological hierarchy aids ag-
gregation (and thus scalability) of the current In-
ternet. Such aggregation schemes designed for a
static metric become ineffective for a network based
on a dynamic metric. Thus, instead of aggregating
based on pre-determined fixed identifiers, a new ag-
gregation scheme based on physical location is de-
fined. The proposal is to devise a new locality pre-
serving, peer-to-peer directory service rather than
a fixed infrastructure DNS service.
Thus, a newer algorithmic basis for Internet pro-
tocols holds the potential to free the current In-
ternet routing from most of the current constraints
that it faces, especially in the routing plane. The
contributions of this proposal, if implemented, shall
lay the basis of a highly dynamic and hence more
robust routing function for the next generation In-
ternet.
8.2. Greedy Routing on Hidden Metrics (GROH
Model)
One of the biggest problems with routing in the
current Internet is scalability. The scalability prob-
lem is not so much due to the large space require-
ments at routers but is more due to the churn as a
result of network dynamics causing table updates,
control messages and route recalculations. The
problem is expected to exacerbate further with the
introduction of IPv6. This problem seems to be
unsolvable in the context of the present design of
routing protocols, hinting towards the need of some
truly disruptive ideas to break this impasse.
The GROH model [64] delivers such an ingenious
and disruptive mechanism by proposing a routing
architecture devoid of control messages. It is based
on the “small world” phenomenon exhibited in Mil-
gram’s social network exercise [81] and later de-
picted in the famous play “Six Degrees of Separa-
tion” [52] in 1990. This experiment demonstrated
the effectiveness of greedy routing in a social net-
work scenario and can be established as the ba-
sis of routing in the Internet which shows similar
scale-free behavior as that of social networks, bio-
logical networks, etc. The idea of greedy routing
on hidden metrics is based on the proposition that:
“Behind every metric space including the Internet
there exists a hidden metric space. The observable
scale free structure of the network is a consequence
of natural network evolution that maximizes the
efficiency of greedy routing in this metric space”.
The objective of the GROH model is to investi-
gate this proposition to try and define the hidden
metric space underlying the Internet topology and
develop a greedy routing scheme that maximizes
the efficiency of routing in this metric space. Such
a greedy routing algorithm belongs to the class of
routing algorithms called “compact routing” that
are aimed at reducing the routing table size, the
node addresses and the routing stretch (the ratio of
distance between the source and destination for a
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given routing algorithm to that of the actual short-
est path distance). However, existing compact rout-
ing algorithms do not address the dynamic nature
of networks, such as the Internet.
Three metric spaces are being considered initially
as part of the investigation to model the Internet’s
scale-free topology. They are: 1) Normed Spaces,
2) Random Metric Spaces, and 3) Expanding Met-
rics. Now using a concrete measured topology of
some network (in this case, the Internet) ‘G’ and
these metric spaces, their combinations or addi-
tional metric spaces as a candidate hidden metric
space ‘H’, a fit of ‘G’ into ‘H’ is found. If a fit of
‘G’ into ‘H’ is found successfully, two tasks are un-
dertaken, 1) Label size determination – Based on
the metric space ‘H’, labels are assigned to each
node such that they facilitate the quick calculation
of distance between two nodes, and 2) Label assign-
ment for new nodes – a new node inspects the labels
of its neighbors in ‘G’ and deduces its location in
the metric space ‘H’. Based on these, the greedy
routing algorithm forwards packets to the neighbor
that takes the packet more closer towards the des-
tination than any other neighbor. Such knowledge
comes at the cost of the node having to maintain
the distance of every destination from each of its
neighbors. However, no network wide updates are
necessary to keep this information and hence avoid-
ing network churn.
An effort towards update-less routing is a promis-
ing step towards solving the scalability problem
of the Internet. However, it remains to be seen
whether such a modeling of the Internet bears fea-
sible and practically usable results.
8.3. HLP: Hybrid Link State Path-Vector Inter-
Domain Routing
Border Gateway protocol (BGP) [151] is the de-
facto standard for inter-domain routing in the cur-
rent Internet. However, BGP fails to satisfy the
needs of an efficient, scalable, secure, and robust
inter-domain routing protocol. Well known prob-
lems of BGP route oscillations and instabilities
[48, 49, 178, 66, 67, 152], slow convergence [65, 74],
blind trust assumptions and lack of support for
trouble shooting have inspired research efforts to-
wards a new Inter-domain routing protocol. HLP
[170] is a step forward in this direction and claims
to be a “clean-sheet redesign of BGP”.
The BGP routing is based on AS (Autonomous
System) path vectors and is agnostic to relation-
ships between ASs. This leads to local routing
events being propagated globally affecting the scal-
ability of BGP, and worse still that most of these
updates are never used. HLP leverages the inher-
ent peering, customer and provider relationships
between ASs to define a hierarchical structure in
inter-domain routing. The implicit inter-AS rela-
tionships in BGP are explicitly stated in HLP to be
able to contain local routing events such as rout-
ing updates, security or configuration errors, pol-
icy enforcements, etc., within relevant boundaries.
Based on this, HLP sets two policy guidelines: (1)
Export-rule guideline – Routes advertised by a peer
or provider are not advertised to another peer or
provider, and (2) Route-Preference Guideline: Pre-
fer routes through customers over routes through
peers or providers.
Another fact used by HLP is that prefix-based
routing, as in BGP, does not usually result in dif-
fering paths than when routing is done at the gran-
ularity level of ASs. Nonetheless, routing at the
granularity of ASs significantly improves the scala-
bility of the routing system and hence adopted by
HLP. Thus, routing at the granularity of ASs and
having established a hierarchical ordering of ASs,
HLP implements a hybrid link state and path vec-
tor routing protocol such that a link state protocol
is used as the routing protocol within an AS hi-
erarchy (of provider customer relationships) while
path vector is used for routing between these hier-
archies. Link state protocol have their advantages
of fast convergence and low churn while path vector
protocols are more suitable for policy enforcements
and scalability. HLP tries to exploit the advantages
of both worlds. A high level view of the HLP mech-
anism as discussed so far, can be seen in Fig. 24
HLP is not a clean-slate or highly innovative de-
sign. However, it is a positive step forward from
breaking away from numerous incremental changes
applied to BGP[151] to re-design an inter-domain
routing protocols from grounds up. Thus HLP is a
starting point from where newer inter-domain rout-
ing protocol ideas may be born.
8.4. eFIT: enabling Future Internet innovations
through Transit wire
ISPs and user networks have different purposes
and characteristics. ISPs are used as a commod-
ity in the present Internet with the sole purpose to
maximize the efficiency of data transport while min-
imizing their costs. User innovations that do not
have immediate positive impact or does not guar-
antee returns in the foreseeable future are generally
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Figure 24: HLP Overview
not appealing to ISPs. On the other hand, user
networks are generally the source of data and also
the seat of innovations. However, the current In-
ternet design is such that ISP’s and user networks
share a common address space. Thus, user innova-
tions cannot be isolated to user networks and of-
ten they roll over to requiring changes in the ISP
networks. This tussle of motivation between user
networks and ISPs limits the innovations that can
be deployed into the Internet.
eFIT proposes a new routing architecture based
on the separation of the transit core from the user
networks. Such a separation allows each of these
components to evolve independently, and given the
difference in their motivations and objectives, this
separation allows them to evolve in the proper di-
rection. The idea is to abstract the transit core
as a wire connecting the user networks. This wire,
called the “Transit Wire”, provides a strong uni-
versal connectivity between the user networks and
evolves with the objective to provide efficient, effec-
tive, available, affordable and plentiful data transit
service for the user networks. The user networks
can thus innovate freely without the concern of hav-
ing to change any part of the deployed infrastruc-
ture of the transit core. A mapping service acts
as an intermediary between the two components,
mapping user addresses into transit paths and also
providing interoperability between diverse mecha-
nisms and protocols used at the two ends of the
wire.
The eFIT idea is thus a clean-slate extension of
the already existing ideas of edge-core separation
for the current Internet. However, while most core
edge separation ideas are motivated to alleviate the
Internet routing scaling problems, eFIT is moti-
vated by the distinct objectives and separate paths
of innovations of these two components.
8.5. ID-Locator split Architectures
Current Internet is faced with many challenges
including routing scalability, mobility, multihom-
ing, renumbering, traffic engineering, policy en-
forcements, and security because of the interplay
between the end-to-end design of IP and the vested
interests of competing stakeholders which leads to
the Internet’s growing ossification. The architec-
tural innovations and technologies aimed at solving
these problems are set back owing to the difficulty
in testing and implementing them in the context of
the current Internet. New designs to address the
major deficiency or to provide new services cannot
easily be implemented other than by step-by-step
incremental changes.
One of the underlying reasons is the overloaded
semantics of IP addresses. In the current Internet,
the IP addresses are used as session identifier in
transport protocols such as TCP as well as the lo-
cator for routing system. This means that the single
IP address space is used as two different namespace
for two purposes, which leads to a series of prob-
lems. The Internet Activity Board (IAB) workshop
on routing and addressing [80] reached a consensus
on the scalable routing issue and the overloaded
meaning of IP addresses. It urged further discus-
sion and experiments on decoupling the dual mean-
ing of IP addresses in the long-term design of NGI.
Currently, there are several proposals for ID-locator
split, but most of them cannot provide a complete
solution to address all the challenges including nam-
ing and addressing, routing, mobility, multihoming,
traffic engineering, and security.
One of the most active research groups of IRTF
(Internet Research Task Force) is RRG (Routing
Research Group) [156], where there is an on-going
debate on deciding which way to go among several
ID-locator split directions. One possible direction
is called “core-edge separation” (or “Strategy A” in
Herrin’s taxonomy [72]) which tries to keep the de-
aggregated IP addresses out of the global routing
tables, and the routing steps are divided into two
levels: the edge routing based on identifier (ID) and
the core routing based on global scalable locators.
“Core edge separation” requires no changes to the
end hosts. Criticisms to this direction include dif-
ficulty in handling mobility and multihoming, and
handling the path-MTU problem [72]. In some so-
lutions, the “weird” ID-based routing in the edge
also makes some purist believe that it is a short-
term patch rather than a long-term solution. Typi-
cal solutions include LISP, IVIP, DYNA, SIX/ONE,
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APT, TRRP (all from [156]). This “core-edge sep-
aration” can be deemed as decoupling the ID from
locator in the network side, which is an intuitive
and direct idea for the routing scalability issue and
relatively easy to deploy, but not good at solving
the host mobility, host multihoming, and traffic en-
gineering.
The other direction is called “ID locator split”
which requires globally aggregatable locators to be
assigned to every host. The IDs are decoupled from
locators in the end hosts’ network stacks and the
mapping between IDs and locators is done by a
separate distributed system. The proposals foll-
woing this direction handle mobility, multihoming,
renumbering, etc well. However, they do require
host changes and it may be hard to ensure compat-
ibility with the current applications. Typical solu-
tions include HIP [54], Shim6 [163], I3 [169], and
Hi3 [85].
It is seen that these two directions have their
own advantages and disadvantages, and it is hard to
judge which one is the right for the future Internet.
Here we describe two example solutions (HIP and
LISP) of these two directions, and after that we dis-
cuss our MILSA [140, 141] solution which combines
the advantages of these two directions and avoids
their disadvantages.
8.5.1. HIP
HIP (Host Identity Protocol) [54] is one of the
most important ID locator split schemes which im-
plements the decoupling of ID from locator in end
hosts. It has been under development in the HIP
working group of IETF for couple of years.
HIP introduces a new public keys based names-
pace of identifiers which enables some end-to-end
security features. The new namespace is called
Host Identity (HI) which is presented as 128-bit
long value called Host ID Tag (HIT). After the de-
coupling of HIs from IP addresses, the sockets are
bound to HITs instead of IP addresses, and the
HITs are translated into IP addresses in the kernel.
HIP defines the protocols and architecture for the
basic mechanisms for discovering and authenticat-
ing bindings between public keys and IP addresses.
It explores the consequence of the ID locator split
and tries to implement it in the real Internet.
Beside security, mobility and multihoming are
also HIP’s design goals and are relatively easier
to implement than the “core-edge separation” so-
lutions. HIP supports opportunistic host-to-host
IPSec ESP (Encaptulation Security Protocol??),
end-host mobility across IPv4 and IPv6, end-host
multi-address multihoming, and application inter-
operability across IPv4/IPv6.
However, for HIP, although the flat crypto-
graphic based identifier is useful for security, it is
not human-understandable and not easy to be used
to setup trust relationship and policies among dif-
ferent domains or organizations. It uses the current
DNS system to do the mapping from ID to locator
which is not capable of deal with the mobility under
fast handover situation, and multihoming. Specif-
ically, mobility is achieved in two ways: UPDATE
packets and rendezvous servers. First way is simple
but it doesn’t support simultaneous movement for
both end hosts. Rendezvous servers are better but
cannot reflect the organizational structure (realm),
and there is no explicit signaling and data separa-
tion in the network layer.
Moreover, HIP requires that all the changes hap-
pen in the end-hosts which may potentially require
significant changes to the current Internet structure
and could lead to compatibility issues for the exist-
ing protocols and applications.
8.5.2. LISP
LISP (Locator ID Separation Protocol) [70]is an-
other important ID locator split scheme following
the “core-edge separation” apporach which imple-
ments the decoupling of ID from locator in the net-
work side instead of the host side. It is being de-
veloped by the LISP working group of IETF.
LISP is a more direct solution for routing scal-
ability issue. LISP uses IP-in-IP packets tunnel-
ing and forwarding to split identifiers from locators
which eliminates the Provider Independent (PI) ad-
dresses usage in the core routing system and thus
enables scalability. The tunnel end-point routers
keep the ID-to-locators cache and the locator ad-
dresses are the IP addresses of the egress tunnel
routers. The mapping from ID to aggregatable lo-
cators is carried at the border of the network, i.e.,
the tunnel end-point routers.
LISP enables site multihoming without any
changes to the end hosts. The mapping from iden-
tifier to RLOC (Routing Locator) is performed by
the edge routers. LISP also doesn’t introduce a new
namespace. Changes to the routers are only in the
edge routers. The high-end site or provider core
routers don’t have to be changed. All these char-
acteristics of LISP lead to a rapid deployment with
low costs. There is also no centralized ID to locator
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mapping database and all the databases can be dis-
tributed which enables high mapping data upgrade
rates. Since LISP doesn’t require all the current
miscellaneous end-hosts with different hardware,
OS platform and applications, and network tech-
nologies to change their current functions, it has
the compatibility benefits compared with HIP. The
requirements for hardware changes are also small
which allows fast product delivery and deployment.
However, LISP uses PI addresses as routable IDs
which potentially leads to some problems. In the
future, it will be necessary to create economic in-
centives to not use the PI addresses, or to create
an automatic method for renumbering by Provider
Aggregatable (PA) addresses.
Obviously, there is a tradeoff between compati-
bility to the current applications and enabling more
powerful functions. Since LISP doesn’t introduce
any changes to the end-host network stack, by de-
sign it cannot support the same level of mobility as
HIP. The host multihoming issue is similar. Specifi-
cally, from design perspectives, LISP lacks the pow-
erful enough support for host mobility, host multi-
homing, and traffic engineering. Some researchers
argue that LISP is a short-term solution for routing
scalability rather than a long-term solution for all
the challenges listed in the beginning of this section.
8.5.3. MILSA
MILSA [140, 141] is basically an end-host based
ID locator split architecture. MILSA introduces a
new ID sublayer into the network layer in the cur-
rent network stack and uses a separate distributed
mapping system to deliver fast and efficient map-
ping lookup and update across the whole Inter-
net. A new ID space is introduced which com-
bines the features of flat IDs and hierarchical IDs.
The new ID space can be used to facilitate the
setup and maintenance of the trust relationships,
and the policy enforcements among different orga-
nizations. Moreover, MILSA implements signaling
and data separation to improve the system perfor-
mance and efficiency. Detailed trust relationship
setup and maintenance policies and processes are
also presented in MILSA.
Several enhancements to MILSA such as secure
hierarchical ID system, multiple ID resolution and
mapping, multicast, many-cast, and service integra-
tion mechanisms are described in [141].
Although MILSA is basically a end-host ID loca-
tor split architecture, it is different from the other
ID locator split solutions such as HIP. MILSA tries
to combine the benefits of the two approaches and
allows them to coexist and evolve to either direc-
tions in the future by providing a hybrid transition
mechanism and incremental deployment strategies.
Through the combination, the two approaches are
integrated into one solution to solve all the prob-
lems identified by the IRTF RRG design goals [71]
which include mobility, multihoming, routing scal-
ability, traffic engineering, and incremental deploy-
abiltiy. It prevents the Provider Independent (PI)
address usage for global routing, and implements
identifier locator split in the host to provide rout-
ing scalability, mobility, multihoming, and traffic
engineering. Also the global routing table size can
be reduced step by step through our deployment
strategy.
8.6. Other Proposals
Several other routing ideas, spanning diverse is-
sues in routing such as user control, simplified man-
agement and control, and multipath routing have
been proposed. These are discussed in this section.
8.6.1. User Controlled Routes
This [188] is a source routing proposal in which
users are allowed to choose the path to destina-
tions. The motivation for this work is similar to
other source routing schemes: (1) foster compe-
tition among ISP’s, and (2) allow more diversity
and control to users in path selection. The mecha-
nism involves route maps which are static maps of
preferred routes of a user. Unlike traditional path
vector mechanisms, route maps are learnt through
advertisement about customers and peers initiated
at the provider. Also, these advertisements spec-
ify costs involved with the paths. The route maps
of a user along with their preference are stored in
a Name-to-route-lookup service (NRLS). To formu-
late a route to a destination, the user first needs to
obtain the destination’s route map and preference
and try and intersect the best possible combina-
tion with its own route map. While the route maps
are static information about AS connectivity, more
dynamic link state information using “connectivity
maps” are also disseminated. Connectivity maps
allows users to update their preferences and route
around problem areas. The impact of such a mech-
anism shall be to support application specific net-
working paradigms more naturally as part of the
architecture.
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User controlled routing is still in its nascent stage
with no discussion on the analytical concerns re-
garding engineering and it would be interesting to
monitor how it progresses.
8.6.2. Switched Internet Architecture
The “Switched Internet Architecture” [162] pro-
posal advocates a clean slate approach to re-design
the Internet by combining the best characteristics
of telephony and data. It proposes a new hierar-
chical addressing scheme along the lines of address-
ing in cellular and telephone networks. The two-
level hierarchy consists of a network ID and a host
ID. The network ID is a concatenation of a hier-
archical geographical addressing scheme (continent
code, country code, state code, area code) with an
organization code. Based on this naming scheme,
the architecture consists of a hierarchical “bank of
switches”, switching packets on predefined digit po-
sition in the addressing scheme. The network pro-
tocol stack as a result of this simplified switching
architecture is reduced to an application layer op-
erating on a port layer (providing port id and data
buffering). This port layer operates on the switch-
ing layer above the physical substrate.
Though it is true that a simple architecture such
as this shall allow many of the management, con-
trol, security and QoS concerns to be taken care
of, their remain serious questions about dynamic-
ity and ownership of such a network. The growth
and success of the Internet to what it is today can
be attributed to user demands fostering mutual co-
operation among ISPs in a fair competitive envi-
ronment. Introducing geographical ID into the ad-
dressing scheme fosters an implicit relation between
all providers in the same geographical area. Also,
the Internet model was designed to serve as a highly
resilient and dynamic network, which may not be
the case if fixed switching state is introduced in the
routing plane.
8.6.3. Routing Control Platform (RCP)
RCP [20] has already been discussed (Section 6.1)
in the context of the centralized approach towards
network management and control. RCP is the ex-
tension of the idea presented in [37]. It proposes
a centralized routing server (RCP) that computes
BPG routes on behalf of the routers in the AS. RCP
receives all BGP routing advertisements through
iBGP, computes routing tables for each router sub-
ject to IGP view and domain policies, and dissem-
inates routing tables to routers. Thus, RCP cen-
tralizes the distributed routing protocol allowing
a cleaner and more effective routing management
and control. Details of RCP implementation can
be found in [77].
As already discussed earlier, policy enforcements
in the current routing protocols cannot be enforced
through a clean interface. They need to be im-
plemented indirectly through tweaking routing pa-
rameters of specific routing protocols and hope
for the desired output in routing tables. The in-
creased complexity of routing management subject
to the increasing needs of fine-grained policy control
clearly suggests that this approach shall not scale
in terms of increasing configurational complexity.
Proposals such as RCP are thus extremely potent
in defining the routing management and control of
the future.
In summary, routing is undoubtedly one of the
major functions of the network. Since there is a
lot of concern about the scalability and security
of the Internet routing mechanisms, the future In-
ternet may see a complete paradigm shift. Re-
search in areas of content distribution are advo-
cating towards content centric [58] and data cen-
tric networks [61]. In similar lines, [143] advo-
cates the necessity of a finer granularity of pol-
icy enforcements wherein the user, data, hosts and
infrastructure exist as separate entities logically
grouped into trust/application domains. Virtual-
ization techniques are touting co-existence of mul-
tiple application specific networks locally optimized
for their specific purpose or objective. Next gener-
ation routing proposals, however, are all designed
around the assumption of the present networking
environment with added concerns of security, scal-
ability and management. We feel that there is a dis-
parity in the next generation Internet objectives be-
tween disruptive next generation architectural ideas
with the more conservative routing architects.
9. Future Internet Infrastructure Design for
Experimentation
9.1. Background: A retrospect of PlanetLab and
others
The fast growth and diversification of the Inter-
net made it extremely difficult to introduce new
technologies and protocols backed up with sound
experimental validation at realistic size testing en-
vironments. PlanetLab [144, 90] was the first effort
to design such a testbed facility that would effec-
tively mimic the scale of the Internet by organizing
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thousands of Internet nodes, spread out at differ-
ent geographic locations, under a common control
framework. These Internet nodes, offered by var-
ious research, educational and industrial organiza-
tions, run Linux virtual server software to virtu-
alize its resources, providing isolated resource al-
location (called “slivers”) to multiple concurrently
active experiments. The node’s virtual servers are
managed by a “Node Manager” (NM), which also
interacts with a centralized control module called
the “PlanetLab Control” or PLC. Experiments are
allocated a “slice” which is composed of multiple
slivers spanning multiple sites. Such a federated
and distributed organization involving node con-
tributors demanding control over the nodes that
they own and users running experiments on these
nodes, warrant the requirement of a trust based se-
curity model that can scale.
To avoid a N ×N blow-up of the trust relation-
ship model, the PLC acts as a trusted intermedi-
ary that manages the nodes on behalf of its owners
according to a set of policies specified by the own-
ers, creates slices by combining resources from these
nodes and manages allocation of “slices” to experi-
menters. PLC supports two methods of actual slice
instantiation at each node, direct and delegated.
PLC runs a slice creation service called “pl conf”
at each node. In the direct method, PLC front-end
directly interacts with the pl conf service to create
a corresponding virtual machine and allocate re-
sources to it. However, in the “delegated” method,
a slice creation agent on behalf of a user contacts
the PLC for a “ticket”. This “ticket” encapsulates
rights to instantiate a virtual machine at a node and
get specified resources allocated to it. The agent
then contacts the pl conf of each node to redeem
this ticket and create a slice for the user. Currently,
two slice creation services are supported on Plan-
etLab, PLC implementing the direct method and
Emulab implementing the delegated method.
Over time, the PlanetLab design has been ex-
tended and modified to provide better and more
efficient control and support. One such extension,
within the PlanetLab control framework itself is to
allow federation of separate and independent Plan-
etLab instances. Federation of such nature necessi-
tates separate instances of PLC’s to be able to com-
municate and coordinate with each other through
well defined interfaces. It can be easily observed
that the PLC conducts two distinct functionalities,
node management on behalf of node owners and
slice creation on behalf of users, allowing the PLC
to export two distinct interfaces. Also, adopting a
hierarchical naming system for slices establishing a
hierarchy of slice authorities ease trust and delega-
tion related issues in federation. These extensions
combined with added facility at the “pl conf” to
create slices on behalf of multiple slice authorities
has lead to the development of regional and private
PlanetLab instances that may peer with the “pub-
lic” PlanetLab instance.
An instance of PlanetLab federation extension
is the Planetlab-Europe testbed, supported by
the Onelab project [91], which is the European
contribution to the world-wide publicly available
Planetlab testbed. However, the Onelab project
is contributing to enhancing the monitoring in-
frastructure of Planetlab[155], extending Planet-
lab to newer contexts such as wireless testbeds
[28, 21, 22], adding capability for IPv6 based mul-
tihoming of sites [86, 87], dealing with unstable
connectivity[78], integrating and mixing emulation
tools [23], and providing a framework for network
measurements.
PlanetLab being organized as an overlay over IP,
it is not necessarily a realistic experimental sub-
strate for network layer protocols. As such, actual
routing protocols and router level code cannot be
run effectively on a PlanetLab slice. The VINI
[92, 13] “running the Internet in a slice” (IIAS)
effort was aimed at filling this void by leveraging
the existing widely distributed PlanetLab network,
user mode linux [30] and advances in open source
router code. Fig. 25 presents the PlanetLab VINI
slice organization. Router code requires root level
kernel access. Thus, running router code directly
over a Planetlab slice is not possible. VINI installs
User Mode Linux (UML) [93, 30] over the Plan-
etLab slice and installs open source router coder,
XORP[94] over it. UML provides a virtual Linux
kernel implementation at the user level. This sets
up a distributed set of routers over a PlanetLab
slice allowing network level experimentation. How-
ever, VINI routers are not directly connected to
each other being part of the PlanetLab overlay net-
work. Thus, any network level experimentation is
hindered by interfering effect of actual path routers
and corresponding routing protocols implemented
on them.
Another extension of PlanetLab concerns extend-
ing the core mechanism of the overlay hosting fa-
cility. Overlay nodes run distributed applications
that might involve a lot of packet routing and for-
warding functionality. However, traditional overlay
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Figure 25: An IIAS router on PL-VINI
nodes are simple computers and are not designed
for fast routing and forwarding of packets. Turner
et al [176] have designed a supercharged PlanetLab
platform (SPP) that implements separate slow and
fast paths for data processing and forwarding. The
slow path is chosen for application specific process-
ing while the fast path is optimized for line-speed
packet forwarding and can be used by overlay appli-
cations needing large amounts of packet processing
and forwarding. The biggest challenge facing the
design of such an overlay node is compatibility with
existing PlanetLab nodes and hiding the complex-
ities of the node design from experimental code.
Thus, SPP introduces a new genre of networking
devices designed for optimized overlay hosting.
One drawback for experimental validation over
realistic testing environments such as PlanetLab is
poor repeatability and lack of experimental control.
As an example, a researcher testing a new applica-
tion optimized to handle intermittent network fail-
ures has to wait for the underlying network envi-
ronment to face such a situation. Also, the nature
of failures cannot be controlled and hence it is dif-
ficult to test the applications response to a wide
range of failure modes. Additionally, the experi-
ments cannot be repeated so that deterministic ap-
plication behavior can be verified. On the contrary,
a simulated testing environment can handle these
requirements though not able to mimic the realis-
tic scale and diversity of a realistic testbed. This
clear partition of capabilities call for a solution that
can leverage the best of both worlds. Emulab[88]
is an effort in this direction. Emulab is PlanetLab
extension that accommodates simulated links and
nodes within PlanetLab slices. This extension al-
lows researchers access to realistic experiments and
at the same time allowing fine grained control and
repeatability.
9.2. Next Generation Network Testbeds: Virtual-
ization and Federation
The next generation of network testbed research
is primarily focused on virtualization and feder-
ation. Virtualization proposes efficient methods
for resource sharing by multiple concurrent experi-
ments on the testbeds subject to the constraints of
maintaining high degree of isolation, fairness, and
security. Federation research looks at the methods
to unify multiple diverse testbeds designed to serve
diverse experimental contexts and realistic experi-
mental environment.
9.2.1. Federation
Networking testbeds strive to provide a realistic
testing and experimentation facility to researchers.
The prime goal is to be able to provide a plat-
form that is as close to the production environ-
ment as possible. “Federation” helps realize this
goal through [138] (1) Providing larger testbed sce-
narios, (2) Providing a diverse testbed with special-
ized or diverse resources such as access technologies
etc, (3) Creating scientific communities with diverse
research backgrounds and inspiring cross discipline
research, and, (4) Amortization of costs through
more efficient sharing.
However, there exists a lot of challenges that
make federation an interesting research problem.
These challenges can be categorized into techni-
cal challenges and political or socio-economic chal-
lenges.
The technical challenges involve problems such
as (1) homogenization of diverse contexts to facil-
itate easy deployment of experiments, (2) fair and
efficient sharing of scarce resources, (3) interoper-
ability of security protocols, etc.
The political or social-economic challenges are
based more on the implications on economics and
organizational policies of sharing such as policies of
governments, conflicts between research agencies,
conflicts between commercial and non-commercial
interests, Intellectual property rights related con-
flicts, etc.
Thus, the problem of federation of testbeds has
different contexts and the solution to a specific sce-
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nario for federation varies in accordance to the con-
text. We shall discuss three approaches to federa-
tion that are under research currently in the Euro-
pean Network Community.
9.2.2. Virtualization
In-spite of the tremendous success of the Inter-
net, it is often made to deliver services that it was
not designed for (e.g., mobility, multi-homing, mul-
ticasting, anycasting, etc.). However, the IP based
one-suite-fits-all model of the Internet does not al-
low innovative new architectural ideas to be seam-
lessly incorporated into the architecture. Innova-
tive and disruptive proposals, either never get de-
ployed or are forced to resort to inefficient ”round
about” means. The huge investments in the de-
ployed infrastructure base of today’s networks add
to this ossification by preventing newer paradigms
of networking from being tested and deployed. Vir-
tualization seems to be the only possible solution
to break this current impasse [5].
Turner et al [177] propose a diversified Internet
architecture that advocates the ideas of virtualiza-
tion of the substrate elements (routers etc.) of the
network infrastructure. Such an approach would al-
low researchers to implement and test diverse rout-
ing protocols (non-IP based) and service paradigms.
The argument is that multiple competing technolo-
gies shall be able to co-exist in large scale exper-
imentation and thus the barrier to entry from ex-
perimentation to production environments shall be
reduced considerably. Such a testbed shall also be
free from all intrinsic assumptions that commonly
malice the credibility of conventional experimental
testbeds.
CABO (Concurrent Architectures are Better
than One) [38] is a design of the next generation
Internet that allows concurrent architectures to co-
exist. The key idea is to de-couple the infrastruc-
ture from the infrastructure services. The infras-
tructure providers in CABO are expected to lease
infrastructure entities such as backbone routers,
backbone links, switches etc., over which service
providers could deploy their own specific protocols
and run their own network services optimized to
specific service parameters such as quality of ser-
vice, low latency, real-time support, etc. The in-
frastructure providers may virtualize their infras-
tructure substrate and thus allow the isolated co-
existence of multiple service providers.
The AKARI Project [95] of Japan also advocates
the use of virtualization as the basis of the Internet
architecture in the next generation [53]. As shown
in Fig. 26, the AKARI project extends the idea
of isolated virtual networks to (1) Transitive vir-
tual networks - cooperation and/or communication
between virtual networks, and (2) Overlaid virtual
networks: One virtual network over the other.
Figure 26: AKARI: Different Virtualization Models
However, though Internet-scale deployment of
virtualization as the basis of the Internet architec-
ture may not be possible in the near future, network
testbed designs may immensely benefit from it. The
properties of isolation and flexibility of virtualiza-
tion suit the needs of next generation testbeds that
need to be able to support diverse architecture ex-
periments on a shared substrate such that they do
not interfere with each other. Also, the feasibil-
ity of the core idea of virtualization as the basis
of an Internet-scale network can be tested through
experiences in deploying testbeds based on virtual-
ization.
Virtualization in Testbed design. The idea of
virtualization to isolate network experiments run-
ning on shared substrate is not new. However, ex-
isting networking testbeds operate on an overlay
above the IP based networks, seriously constrain-
ing the realism of network level experiments. To
overcome this impasse, the future of networking
testbeds shall have to be designed for end-to-end
isolation, requiring the virtualization of end-hosts,
substrate links and substrate nodes.
Turner [175] proposes a GENI substrate design
that allows multiple meta-networks to co-exist.
Each meta-network consist of a meta-router (a vir-
tualized slice from a router) and meta-links joining
the meta networks. The design of substrate routers
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that support co-existence of several meta-routers
has to cope with the challenges of flexibly allocating
bandwidth and generic processing resources among
the meta-routers, maintaining isolation properties.
The three main components of a router are: (1) line
cards – terminate physical links and process pack-
ets, (2) switching fabric – transfers data from line
cards where they arrive to line cards connected to
outgoing links, and (3) control processor – a gen-
eral purpose microprocessor for control and man-
agement functions of the router such as running
routing protocols, updating tables at the line cards
etc.
A natural design choice of virtualizing such a
hardware would be to virtualize the line cards to
derive meta line cards. However, this approach fails
since the multi-core network processors on these
line cards share a common memory causing the
meta line cards to interfere with each other. In-
stead, a “processing pool architecture” is employed
in which the processing resources used by the meta
routers are separated from the physical link inter-
faces. As shown in Fig. 27, a set of processing
engines (PE) connected to the line cards through a
switch. The line cards that terminate the physical
links abstain from doing any packet processing and
just forward the packets to the PE’s through the
switching fabric. A meta-network may use one or
more than one PE’s for packet processing. Details
of the isolation of the switching fabric and other
architectural details can be found in [175].
Figure 27: Architecture of a Programmable Router design
Developing specialized substrate nodes as dis-
cussed in [177] shall take considerable amount of
time, effort and research to be developed. Also,
such substrates present only in research facilities
shall greatly constrain the magnitude and realism
of experiments. A shorter-term solution that can
allow similar experimentation flexibility over sub-
strate nodes in campus networks is proposed in
[96, 79]. To be able to do so, substrate produc-
tion nodes in campus networks need to provide
an open, programmable virtualized environment for
researchers to be able to install and run their ex-
periments. However, this approach has two prob-
lems. Network administrators shall not be comfort-
able to allow running experimental code on produc-
tion routers or switches and commodity router and
switch manufacturers are ever reluctant to divulge
the technology that sits inside their high-end prod-
ucts, thus providing no chance for virtualization,
either software or hardware.
To break this impasse, an open-flow switch has
been designed that (1) provides complete isolation
of production traffic from experimental traffic thus
easing the anxiety of network administrators, and
(2) does not require commodity hardware manufac-
turers to open their internal architecture except for
incorporating the Open-flow switch into their hard-
ware. The design of the switch takes advantage
of TCAM (Ternary Content-Addressable Memory)
based flow tables used mostly by all routers and
switches. The idea is to identify incoming packets
based on flow parameters (IP addresses, ports, etc.)
and take appropriate action as directed in the flow
table for a packet belonging to a certain flow. The
action can be as simple as forwarding the packet to
a particular port (for production traffic) or encap-
sulating and forwarding the packet to the controller
(for the first packet of any flow or for a certain ex-
perimental traffic). The exact details of the switch
specification is beyond the scope of the current dis-
cussion and may be found at [79].
The virtualization techniques discussed in these
two schemes are in addition to the various other
schemes of virtualization of end systems through
virtual machine or virtual server techniques. How-
ever, these virtualization techniques do not suffice
the needs of wireless environment. The key prob-
lems are, (1) Isolation: While it is not possible to
over-provision the wireless bandwidth, the scarcity
of the wireless bandwidth resource forces new par-
titioning models to be able to support a reasonable
number of isolated experiments, and (2) Unique-
ness of nodes: Wireless signal propagation is a
node specific property (coding, multiplexing, etc.)
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and difficult to control. Some techniques for vir-
tualization of wireless network elements are dis-
cussed in [142]. Some of the techniques for sharing
the wireless resource are: (1) Frequency Divi-
sion Multiple Access (FDMA): The transmit-
ting frequencies may be partitioned using FDMA,
(2) Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA):
The node is partitioned on the time domain, (3)
Combined TDMA and FDMA: Virtualize the
node by allowing different users to use given fre-
quency partition for a specific period of time, (4)
Frequency Hopping: Virtualize the node by al-
lowing different users to use different frequency par-
titions at different time-slots, and (5) Code Di-
vision Multiple Access: Each user is give an
unique and orthogonal code and is allowed to use
the entire frequency for the entire time without in-
terference with each other.
Using a combination of these virtualization tech-
niques, a wireless testbed may offer sliceability
through (1) Space Division Multiple Access
(SDMA): A node with a fixed wireless range is
dedicated fully to a user and partitioning is done
using spatial separation of multiple nodes in the
testbed, (2) Combined SDMA and TDMA:The
nodes are spatially separated and also each node is
partitioned using TDMA creating time slots, (3)
Combined SDMA and FDMA: the nodes are
separated spatially and each node is partitioned us-
ing FDMA, creating frequency partitions, and (4)
Combined SDMA, TDMA and FDMA: The
nodes are spatially separated, and each node is par-
titioned by frequency partitions and each frequency
partition is partitioned into time slots.
Thus, virtualization is widely accepted to be the
basis for enabling a flexible Internet architecture
for the future that would accommodate multiple
architectures and allow disruptive innovations and
technologies to be easily incorporated into the core
architectures. As for the present, testbed designs
based on virtualization concepts serve, both as a
proof-of-concept for virtualizable Internet architec-
ture of the future as well as a hosting substrate for
testing of disruptive technologies for the future.
9.3. Next Generation Network Testbeds: Imple-
mentations
The two biggest efforts in this direction are
the GENI (Global Environment for Network
Innovations)[97] effort in the US and the FIRE (Fu-
ture Internet Research and Experimentation)[98]
effort in Europe. While the primary GENI objec-
tive is make a dedicated shared substrate facility
available for large scale and long-lived experiments,
the primary focus of the FIRE project is to federate
multiple existing network testbeds in Europe (as a
result of prior programs) and provide a large multi-
context realistic testbed available for research. In
the next two subsections we shall briefly discuss the
GENI and FIRE projects limiting our scope to the
GENI substrate architecture and FIRE federation
efforts.
9.3.1. Global Environment for Network Innova-
tions (GENI)
GENI or Global Environment for Network Inno-
vations is an effort by the National Science Foun-
dation (NSF) in the United States to design and
implement a novel suite of network infrastructure
[44] to allow large scale, long-lived and realistic
networking experimentation. GENI shall have its
own dedicated backbone link infrastructure through
partnerships with the LambdaRail [99] and the In-
ternet2 [100] projects. GENI is also expected to
federate with a wide range of other infrastructural
facilities to add to its diversity and support for re-
alism. In the rest of this sub-section on GENI, we
first discuss the key GENI requirements, the gener-
alized GENI control framework and finally we look
into the five different cluster projects, each devel-
oping a prototype control framework for GENI un-
derlying the components of the generalized GENI
control framework.
GENI Requirements. GENI comprises of a set
of hardwire components including computer nodes,
access links, customizable routers, switches, back-
bone links, tail links, wireless subnets, etc. Ex-
periments on GENI shall run on a subset of these
resources called a “slice”. In general, two types of
activities shall be supported over the GENI testbed,
(1) deployment of prototype network systems and
observing them under real usage, and (2) running
controlled experiments. Some of the key require-
ments for the GENI infrastructure are:
1. Sliceability: In order for GENI to be cost-
effective and be able to cater to as many exper-
imental requirements as possible, GENI shall
need to support massive sharing of resources,
at the same time ensuring isolation between
experiments.
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2. Programmability: GENI is a testing-
environment needing generality. All GENI
components need to be programmable so that
researchers are able to implement and deploy
their own set of protocols at the component
level.
3. Virtualization and Resource Sharing: Slieabil-
ity entails sharing of resources. A common
form of resource sharing is through virtualiza-
tion techniques, wherever possible. However,
for some resources, owing to the some inherent
properties of the resource (e.g., an UMTS link
can support only one active connection at a
time), other methods such as time-shared mul-
tiplexing etc., may be employed.
4. Federation: The GENI suite is expected to be a
federated whole of many different parts owned
and managed by different organizations. Fed-
eration also adds diversity to the underlying re-
source pool, thus allowing experiments to run
closer to real production systems.
5. Observability: GENI is an experimental facil-
ity. Hence, the GENI design should allow a
efficient, flexible, robust and easily specifiable
measurement framework.
6. Security: GENI is expected to run many dis-
ruptive and innovative protocols and algo-
rithms. Also, GENI experiments may be al-
lowed to interact with existing Internet func-
tionality. Hence, security concerns require that
GENI nodes cannot harm the production In-
ternet environment, either maliciously or acci-
dentally.
Several other requirements and detailed discus-
sions can be found in the GENI design documents
[6, 161, 26, 150, 16, 14, 62]. However, the key value
proposition of GENI that separates it from smaller
scale or more specific testbeds are:
1. Wide scale deployment – Access not restricted
to those who provide backbone resources to
GENI.
2. Diverse and extensible set of network technolo-
gies
3. Support for real user traffic.
In the rest of this discussion on GENI, we focus
specifically on the control architectural framework
of GENI and also look at some of the protocol de-
signs that are being undertaken as the first phase
of prototype design. ‘
GENI: Generalized Control Framework. Be-
fore looking at the specific prototype designs for the
GENI generalized control framework in Fig. 28, we
need to look at the generic GENI control frame-
work as defined in [45]. GENI consists of several
subsystems:
1. Components and Aggregate Components: A
device which hosts a set of resources is called
a component. The resources of a compo-
nent may be shared through virtualization or
other methods among multiple experiments
such that they satisfy the properties of pro-
grammability, isolation, and security. A set of
components under a central control is called an
aggregate. A component may belong to one or
more such aggregates.
2. Clearinghouses and Control Framework: A
clearinghouse is a centralized registry that
maintains the information for principles, slices,
and components. This information in the reg-
istries may be used to drive access control poli-
cies, control policies, trust mechanisms and
federation mechanisms for the components or
the aggregates within its scope of control.
3. Measurement Subsystem: The measurement
sub-system satisfies the “Observability” goal of
GENI. It provides a framework for measure-
ment, archival and retrieval of experimental
data.
4. Administration & Operations: This subsys-
tem provides tools, services, and technical sup-
port for enabling and incorporation of new
resources into GENI, identifying and manag-
ing mis-behaving resources and assisting re-
searchers using GENI.
5. Experimenter Tools & Services: This subsys-
tem provides support tools for easy experiment
deployment and execution. These tools include
functionalities such as resource discovery, re-
source reservation, designing, composing, de-
bugging, instrumentation, access policies, etc.
Apart from the components discussed above, in
GENI control framework, each aggregate has a Ag-
gregate Manager (AM) and every component has
a Component Manager (CM). Also, the clearing-
house has a Slice Manager (SM) that can reserve
slices for a particular experiment. Also, the control
framework defines (1) Interfaces between the enti-
ties, (2) Message types, (3) Message flow between
entities to realize an experiment, and (4) a control
plane for transporting messages between entities.
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Figure 28: GENI: Generalised Control Framework and Constituent Subsystems
More details of the control framework of GENI can
be found at [45].
GENI Control Framework: Prototype Clus-
ters. The GENI genralized control framework de-
fines a generic meta-architecture with some key
named entities to provide a sliceable experimental
facility. However, the exact nature of the control
activities, the design of the control plane and its im-
plementation is still under active consideration. As
such, under the spiral 1 [101], the GENI has set up 5
clusters, with each cluster responsible to implement
and deploy a prototype implementation of a con-
trol mechanism suitable to be incorporated as the
control mechanism of the GENI control framework.
These five clusters are: (1) Cluster A – TIAD, (2)
Cluster B – Planetlab, (3) Cluster C – ProtoGENI,
(4) Cluster D – ORCA, and (5) Cluster E – ORBIT.
The discussion is restricted to discussing the control
framework design and the federation mechanisms
in each cluster prototype development. Ancillary
projects within each cluster developing aggregates,
virtualized nodes, etc. are beyond the scope of the
current discussion.
Cluster A: Trial Integration Environment
with DETER (TIED) Control Framework.
The “Cluster A” GENI prototype uses the DETER
[102, 15] control framework and designs a federation
architecture for the security experiment testbeds
anticipating the GENI control framework. DETER
is an Emulab based testbed architecture extended
to specifically support robust experiment isolation
for cyber-security experimentation [103]. Cyber-
security experimentations enforce added concerns
of security in which an experiment may try to
break-free from its isolated environment and at-
tack other experiments, testbed control hardware
and also the Internet. Malicious code running as
experiments inside the testbed with root access
on the nodes can spoof its IP or MAC address.
Hence, isolation needs to be implemented right at
layer 2 of the protocol stack. DETER handles
this through VLAN (Virtual LAN) technology and
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switched Ethernet connectivity. The details of the
exact architecture of the DETER testbed can be
found at [15]. Thus, DETER supports a secure
sliceability capability which ensures strict isolation
of experiments running on a common substrate [68].
Also, a federation model of DETER with other Em-
ulab [88] based testbeds, such as WAIL [89], can be
found at [36].
Federation Architecture: TIED proposes a
dynamic federation architecture through a fed-
erator module mediating between distributed re-
searchers and distributed, diverse testbed environ-
ments. A user is supposed to specify his experi-
mental requirements in some high level constructs
which are mapped to experiment topology, resource
requirement, etc. by an experiment creation tool.
The experiment creation tool may also have as in-
puts, the specific properties of testbeds in the fed-
erated environment. The experiment creation tools
finally submit an “experiment representation” to
the “Federator”. The federator is responsible to
set-up a coherent experiment across resources from
multiple testbeds, abstracting the specific control
and management heterogeneity from users. A di-
agrammatic representation of the TIED federation
architecture can be seen in Fig. 29. SEER [157]
is the Security Experimental Environment for DE-
TER which comprises of various tools integrated
to ease the configuration of security experiments
by researchers, while DRAGON [104] allows inter-
domain dynamic resource allocation across multi-
ple heterogeneous networking technologies. Details
of SEER and DRAGON are beyond the scope of
the present discussion and an interested reader is
encouraged to follow the references to know more
about them.
Figure 29: TIED Federation Mechanism
As part of the spiral 1 prototype development ef-
fort, TIED undertakes the following activities [46]
(1) Development and deployment of TIED compo-
nent manager and clearinghouse packages, (2) oper-
ate a clearinghouse prototype for TIED, (3) Provide
GENI users access to TIED testbed. Thus, TIED
allows GENI prototype developers to use TIED
clearinghouse and component implementations in
their own aggregate mangers leveraging the TIED
federation architecture and also the secure and con-
trolled experimental environment provided for secu-
rity experiments in DETER.
Cluster B: PlanetLab Control Framework.
“Cluster B” utilizes the Planetlab control frame-
work. While the Planetlab control framework is
extended to coalesce with the GENI control frame-
work and realize the GENI design goals of federa-
tion and sliceability, the rest of the six projects are
involved in designing substrate nodes with diverse
capabilities for resource sharing and isolation, and
their corresponding component managers.
Planetlab has already been discussed in Section
9.1. The “cluster B” prototype development effort
enhances the control framework for Planetlab and
extends it to be able to coherently federate all slice
based architecture network substrates [145] such as
PlanetLab, VINI, Emulab and GENI. The various
enhancements are implemented through a GENI
wrapper module [146] that bundles an Aggregate
Manager, Slice Manager and a Registry into the
PlanteLab Control (PLC) and also a Component
Manager to individual nodes (nodes in PlanetLab
correspond to components of GENI [145]).
The plain Vanilla Planetlab implementation of
the GENI wrapper is shown in Fig. 30. Users setup
a slice by interacting with the slice manager. The
slice manager contacts the registry to get the neces-
sary credentials and then contact the slice manager
interface of the Aggregate Manager to create and
control the slice. The Aggregate manager commu-
nicates to the individual components through the
component manager’s slice management interface.
Federation Architecture: Based on the vanilla
PlanetLab implementation, federation with other
slice based architectures may be architected as fol-
lows:
1. Alternative Slice Manager: As shown in Fig.
31 for the case of federation between Planet-
Lab and Emulab, the Emulab Slice Manager
contacts the PlanetLab Registry to retrieve the
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Figure 30: Plain Vanilla Implementation of GENI Wrapper
credentials, then it contacts the PlanetLab Ag-
gregate Manager to retrieve a ticket for each
slice and finally it redeems those ticket directly
with the PlanetLab nodes through the compo-
nent managers.
Figure 31: PlaneLab Emulab Federation: Alternative Slice
Manager
2. Common Registry: As shown in Fig. 32, A
common registry is maintained between the
federating entities, PlanetLab and Emulab,
such that the credentials are commonly main-
tained at the PLC and Emulab may retrieve
these credentials and use it to create and slices
purely on Emulab nodes through the Emulab
Aggregate Manager.
Figure 32: PlaneLab Emulab Federation: Common Registry
3. Multiple Aggregates: As shown in Fig. 33
for the case of Planetlab and VINI, PlanetLab
Slice Manager retrieves credentials from the
common registry and may use these credentials
to create slices through the Aggregate man-
agers of both PlanetLab as well as VINI. This
results in a federation where users are allowed
to run their experiments spanning multiple di-
verse testbeds such that one of the testbeds (in
this case VINI) not implementing any Registry
or Slice management functionality.
Figure 33: PlanetLab VINI Federation: Multiple Aggregates
4. Full Aggregation: As shown in Fig. 34, full
federation involves both the federating parties
maintaining their own registries. This allows
a “multiple aggregate” scenario wherein each
federating party are functionally independent
from each other, implementing their own Slice
manager, aggregate manager and Registry and
users specifically belonging to one testbed may
create and control components from both the
testbeds.
Figure 34: PlanetLab PlanetLab-Europe Federation: Full
Aggregation
Cluster C: ProtoGENI Control Framework.
The control framework in ProtoGENI [105] is an
enhanced version of the Emulab control software.
The ProtoGENI clearinghouse [106] has been de-
signed to allow it to be shared by all memebers of
the ProtoGENI federation as shown in Fig. 35 and
performs the following two functions: (1) Allows
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users to find components and (2) Acts as a central
point of trust for all members in the federation.
Figure 35: ProtoGENI Control Framework
Federation Architecture: Each member of the
ProtoGENI federation is an Emulab installation
site and has to have a self generated and self signed
root certificate. This certificate becomes the iden-
tity of the federate site within ProtoGENI. Thus
a “web of trust” is formed between all the mem-
bers of the federaton. A user is provided with an
SSL certificate issued by its local Emulab instance
which authenticates the user to the entire federa-
tion. Certification Revocation Lists (CRL) are sent
by each member of the federation to the Clear-
inghouse, where they are combined and sent out
to each member of the federation. The Aggregate
Manager of ProtoGENI is implemented by placing
the Component Manager API code on top of the
Emulab software. Thus, this makes any site run-
ning the latest version of Emulab code to join the
federation quite easily. It may be noted that the
federation concepts of ProtoGENI is in contrast to
that of the Planetlab federation concept that al-
lows federation between any two testbeds that im-
plement a slice based architecture.
Cluster D: Open Resource Control Architec-
ture (ORCA) Control Framework. The “clus-
ter D” GENI prototype development plan involves
the extension of ORCA (a candidate control frame-
work for GENI) [107] to include the optical re-
sources available in BEN (Breakable Experimental
Network). ORCA is a control plane approach to
secure and efficient management of heterogeneous
resources [108]. ORCA is different from traditional
resource management schemes based on middle-
wares operating between the host operating system
supplying resources and the applications request-
ing them. ORCA defines a paradigm of resource
management wherein the resource management of
ORCA runs as an “underware” [25] below the host
operating system. ORCA uses virtualization to
allocate “containers” over which the resource re-
questor may install its own environment. Hence, as
shown in Fig. 36, the ORCA control plane may be
viewed as an “Internet Operating System” support-
ing a diverse set of user environments on a common
set of hardware resources.
Figure 36: ORCA Control Plane
Also, as shown in Fig. 37, the ORCA “under-
ware” control plane allows federation of various
heterogeneous underlying resource pools, each with
their own set of resource allocation policies.
Figure 37: ORCA Underware
Federation Architecture: The implementa-
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tion of federation of diverse resource pools is archi-
tected through Shakiro[57] resource leasing archi-
tecture based on the SHARP [43] secure resource
peering framework. Each SHARP resource has a
type with associated attributes and available quan-
tity. As shown in Fig. 38, the site exports a leas-
ing service interface. An application specific service
manager may make resource request through the
lease API to the broker. The broker matches the re-
quirements and issues tickets for particular resource
types, quantity and location. The service manager
may then redeem the tickets with the site-leasing
service interface which allocates resources and sets
them up.
Figure 38: ORCA Federation Mechanism
Cluster E: The ORBIT Control Framework.
The “cluster E” GENI prototype is based on the
extension of cOntrol and Management Framewrk
(OMF) [111] of ORBIT to suit the GENI compliant
control framework. ORBIT [109, 110] is an unique
wireless networking testbed which comprises of (1)
A laboratory based wireless network emulator for
an initial, reproducible testing environment, and
(2) A real-world testbed environment of wireless
nodes (mix of 3G and 802.11 wireless access) for
field validation of experiments.
The OMF is the control and management frame-
work for ORBIT. As shown in Fig. 39, the user
end has an “Experiment Controller” component
that is responsible for controlling an user experi-
ment, translating an experiment description to re-
source requirement and communicating with the
resource manager for allocation and control or re-
quired resources. The OMF has three primary com-
ponents: (1) The Aggregate Manager – Responsi-
ble for the overall management of the testbed, (2)
Resource Manager - Exists on every Resource and
manages various aspects of the resource, and (3)
Resource Controller –Communicates with an ex-
periment controller to control the part of the re-
source committed to an experiment. Finally, a cen-
tralized database stores and retrieves experimental
measurement data.
Figure 39: ORBIT cOntrol and Management Framework
(OMF)
The OMF is a candidate control framework for
GENI and hence the OMF design is being extended
to: (1) support multiple heterogeneous hardware,
(2) support resource virtualization to support mul-
tiple experiments sharing a resource, (3) federate
multiple testbeds, and (4) add dynamic steering of
experimental control.
Federation Architecture: As part of the Spi-
ral 1 effort, OMF is being extended to support mul-
tiple heterogeneous testbeds in accordance with the
GENI control framework[112]. Already, OMF has
been extended to support mobile testbeds by defin-
ing methods to: (1) distribute experiment scripts
to mobile nodes, (2) cache experimental measure-
ment data locally on the node in cases of disconnec-
tion, and (3) perform experiment actions at prede-
fined points in time experimental. This extension
of OMF is aimed to demonstrate the capability of
OMF to support multiple heterogeneous testbeds
and thus concur to the GENI design requirements.
9.3.2. FIRE Testbeds
The counterpart of the GENI effort in the US is
the Future Internet Research and Experimentation
(FIRE) effort of the European Union.
A diverse set of testbeds for networking experi-
mentation and testing, in various contexts of access
technologies, engineering motivations and layered
and cross layered architecture validation, were de-
veloped as part of various past research efforts in
Europe. The basis of most of this work relates back
to the GEANT project [113] which was undertaken
to connect 30 National Education and Research
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Networks (NREN’s), spread across Europe through
a multi gigabit network dedicated specifically for re-
search and educational use. The GEANT network
thus provides the high bandwidth infrastructure to
be shared among various research projects ranging
from grid computing to real time collaborative ex-
perimentation support. Also, multiple cutting edge
network services, such as IPv6, IP with QoS, multi-
casting, premium IP (prioritized IP based services)
etc., have been implemented and are available over
GEANT. Hence, GEANT is not a testbed but a
production level network infrastructure serving the
research community in Europe, much in the spirit
of the original NSFNet, LambdaRail [99], CSENET
or Internet2 [100] networks in various other parts of
the world.
A discussion of GEANT was essential in the
present context because the European effort for in-
frastructure development for the next generation
Internet experimentation and testing is mostly fo-
cused on efforts towards the federation of diverse
individual testbeds over the GEANT infrastructure
facility. Federation is defined as “a union com-
prising a number of partially self-governing regions
united by a central federal government under a com-
mon set of objectives” [138]. Fig. 40 shows various
testbed development research projects that were
undertaken as part of the Framework 6 program,
most of which are either complete or almost reach-
ing completion [114].
Figure 40: Overview of FP6 Projects
These projects are expected to serve as the foun-
dations for the FIRE facility with the projects such
as Onelab 2 [91], Panlab II [115], VITAL++ [116]
and WISEBED [117], exploring ideas for the fed-
eration of these facilities into a single large experi-
mental facility. Another project, FEDERICA [118],
is aimed at developing an end-to-end isolated ex-
perimental facility over dedicated high speed links
provisioned over existing educational and research
networks. FEDERICA has similar “sliceability” ob-
jectives as that of GENI. As shown in Fig. 41, while
the other FIRE projects mainly concentrate on fed-
eration aiming to support experimentation on a di-
verse and rich set of underlying technologies, FED-
ERICA is more of a virtualization proposal aimed
at allowing end-to-end disruptive innovations in ar-
chitecture and protocol design.
Figure 41: Relationship Amongst Various FIRE Projects
In the rest of this section, we shall discuss the
virtualization concepts of FEDERICA followed by
the federation mechanisms of Onelab 2, PANLAB
and PII, and WISEBED.
FEDERICA. FEDERICA [39, 40] connectes 12
PoPs (Point of Presence) using high speed (1 Gbps)
dedicated circuit infrastructure provisioned via the
education and research infrastructure of GEANT2
[119] and NRENs and virtualization techniques to
create a “slice” consisting of virtual circuits, vir-
tualizable and programmable switches and routers,
virtualizable computing resources. The “slice” is
the fundamental unit of allocation for a user’s ex-
perimental needs. The substrate just creates the
necessary resource configuration and is completely
agnostic about the protocol, services and appli-
cations running on them. For those users wish-
ing to test a distributed application may request
a set of virtual routers and hosts pre-configured
with IP and those users wanting to test a novel
routing protocol may request a set of virtual hosts
and routers interconnected over Ethernet circuits
forming a specified topology. In fact, the FEDER-
ICA approach of resource sharing and end-to-end
experiment isolation is very similar to the propos-
als of a diversified Internet architecture discussed
in [177, 5].
FEDERICA has four core sites and 8 on-core
sites. The core sites are connected into a full mesh
topology through high-speed (1 Gbps) GEANT2
infrastructure links. The core allows only direct
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dedicated channels between the core switches mak-
ing the core highly resilient and efficient. The core
also allows BGP peering with the global Internet
subject to security restrictions. Non-core POP’s do
not have the strict requirement of direct connection.
Hence, non-core POP’s can connect to FEDERICA
via the GEANT2 infrastructure, via NRENs or via
the public Internet. Also there is another group
of POP’s called collaborative POPs. Collaborative
POPs do not provide guaranteed resources to the
infrastructure and also they are managed and con-
trolled by their owners.
A major difference between FEDERICA and
other similar efforts such as GENI is that, FED-
ERICA is much more modest in terms of size and
diversity. The only objective of FEDERICA is to
develop an end-to-end isolated testing environment
to be able to support innovative and disruptive net-
work experimentation. As a result, FEDERICA
will be available for researchers much sooner than
any of the other similar testbed design efforts.
OneLab2. OneLab2 is the current extension of
OneLab and has a focus on research using open
source tools and softwares. It is primarily non-
commercial and hence the primary challenges for
federation are technical rather than political. Also,
as discussed in [139], an economic incentive based
model needs to be developed to increase the re-
source contribution by each participating site. Re-
source provisioning in Planetlab currently follows a
minimum fixed contribution rule wherein each site
needs to contribute atleast 2 nodes to be a part
of the system. The allocation policies of Planet-
lab restrict each site from having at most 10 slices.
However, since each slice has unrestricted access to
resources irrespective of the number of nodes they
contribute to the system, these allocation policies
are not economic-centric in the sense that there
does not exist enough incentive for a site to pro-
vision more resources for the system. To develop
effective economic incentive models, wherein allo-
cation is somehow related to contribution, the first
step is to develop a metric for evaluating the value
of a site through characterization of the resources
offered. A suggestion [147] is to characterize re-
sources based on three broad characteristics: (1)
Diversity (technology, number of nodes etc), (2)
Capacity (CPU, bandwidth, memory etc), and (3)
Time (duration, reliability etc).
Federation Mechanism: The present feder-
ation policies between Planetlab and Planetlab-
Europe are that of “peering” wherein users from
both facilities have the same access rights over the
whole infrastructure and both facilities apply the
same local policy. However, pairwise federation
leads to the common full mesh “n X n” scalability
problems, with “n” being the number of federating
sites. The problem worsens with plans to have large
scale localized federations across heterogeneous net-
working contexts as discussed in Section 9.2.1. This
calls for a hierarchical federation architecture in
which an instance of PlanetLab central federates
with various regional/local/personal PlanetLab in-
stances which in turn federate with local testbeds
[147]. Also, another model of federation could be
based on Consumer-Provider relationship in scenar-
ios wherein the users of one local federation form a
sub-set of users of a larger federation. Hierarchical
federation policies, however, introduce the added
concerns of “Local Vs Global Policy” enforcements.
PANLAB and PII (Panlab II). PANLAB is
the acronym for Pan European Laboratory and is
mostly a consortium of telecom service providers
across Europe. It was an effort to federate dis-
tributed test laboratories and testbeds across Eu-
rope to provide a diverse and heterogeneous facility
for large scale networking experiments. It provides
a realistic testing environment for novel service con-
cepts, networking technologies and business models
prior to their launching into production environ-
ments.
Federation Mechanism: The main challenges
for the creation of Panlab involve defining an archi-
tecture for diverse contextual platforms to be able
to federate across a seamless homogenized platform
accessible to its users. PANLAB takes an evolu-
tionary approach, moving towards higher degree of
automation in the management and control func-
tions of the testbed. Fig. 42 shows the third and
final level of this evolution. The three phases of
evolution are:
1. Centralized approach: This is the first
phase. Each partner site shall have to fill up
a web form manually detailing the testbed de-
scriptions and resources available for sharing.
This form is provided by a web based search
services called Teagle. Users wishing to run an
experiment submit the nature of the experi-
mental requirements to Teagle. Teagle looks
up the repository of testbed meta-data and
tries to find a match.
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2. Manual Configuration Approach: In this
phase, the partner sites advertise the testbed
meta-data by using a specialized middleware
and expose a “Infra-structure as a Service
(IaaS)” interface [42]. Teagle will search the
repository as well as query this service for re-
quired resources. In this phase, resources are
virtualized and, hence, the IaaS may hide the
actual location of a resource from the user pro-
viding infrastructure from one or more partner
sites.
3. On-Demand Configuration approach: In
this final phase of evolution shown in Fig. 42,
Teagle will establish an on-demand testbed ac-
cording to the user requirement by directly in-
teracting with the virtualized resources. Tea-
gle provides a best effort configuration and the
users need to directly access the resources for
complex configurations.
Figure 42: PANLAB Federation Final Phase: On-Demand
Configuration Aproach
PANLAB also proposes the use of IMS (Internet
Protocol Multi-media Sub-system) to support the
control plane of the federation. PII or PANLAB
II is an extension of PANLAB and includes a fed-
erated testbed of four core innovative clusters and
three satellite clusters[115]. PII takes a more holis-
tic view of federation by considering the breadth of
technological, social, economical and political con-
siderations of the federation.
9.3.3. WISEBED
The WISEBED project [183] is aimed at feder-
ating large-scale wireless sensor testbeds to pro-
vide a large, diversified, multi-level infrastructure of
small-scale heterogeneous devices. An Open Feder-
ation Alliance (OFA) is defined that develops open
standards for accessing and controlling the federa-
tion. WISEBED classifies the diverse testbeds into
two categories: (1) Fully Integrated: The testbed
defines a full range of services as defined by the
OFA, and (2) Semi Integrated: Provides sunset of
the service defined in the OFA. Another classifica-
tion based on the access to the testbed also con-
sists of two categories: (1) Fully Accessible: users
can access the testbed data and also re-program the
testbed devices, and (2) Semi Accessible: Users are
only permitted to extract experimental data from
the testbed.
Federation Mechanism: As shown in Fig. 43,
WISEBED federates multiple wireless sensor node
testbeds comprising of a diverse range of hardware
and software technologies. The federation mecha-
nism of WISEBED consists of a hierarchy of layers,
with each layer comprising of one or more peers.
The bottom layer consists of a network of wire-
less sensor nodes belonging to diverse hardware and
software technologies. Each testbed exposes a web
based portal through which users may deploy, con-
trol and execute experiments. These portal servers
form the second layer of the WISEBED federation
architecture. The third and final layer is an overlay
of the portal servers. Each portal server exposes its
services through an identical interface allowing the
federation to expose an unified virtual testbed to
the users. Each site participating in the federation
needs to expose Open Federation Alliance (OFA)
standardized interfaces for accessing and control-
ling the testbed.
Fig. 44 presents a high level view of the portal
servers. The portal servers are responsible for the
control, management and measurements of a single
site. The inner layer consists of services that can
communicate with hardware sensor devices through
gateways to the wireless networks. User commands
are translated into a generic binary packet format
that can be understood by the wide and diverse
wireless substrate technologies of the testbed. Also,
each portal server is connected to one or more, lo-
cal data stores for storing measurement data. The
“outer layer” exposes service interfaces for users to
access the testbed through the portal server.
Either these portal servers or a separate over-
lay node running client services to the portal server
in its “inner layer” and exporting portal server in-
terface in its outer layer, run an overlay software
to form the federate with other sites. An user re-
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Figure 43: Overall Architecture of WISEBED Testbed Fed-
eration
Figure 44: WISEBED: High Level view of Portal Servers
quiring o use federated resources may connect using
OFA standard web services through the overlay.
10. Conclusions
A number of industry and government funding
agencies throughout the world are funding research
on architecture for future networks that is “clean-
slate” and is not bound by the constraints of the
current TCP/IP protocol suite. In this paper, we
have provided an overview of several such projects.
National Science Foundation (NSF) in the United
States started a ”Future Internet Design (FIND)”
program which has funded a number of architec-
tural studies related to clean-slate solutions for vir-
tualization, high-speed routing, naming, security,
management and control. It also started Global
Environment for Network Innovations (GENI) pro-
gram that is experimenting with various testbed
designs to allow the new architectural ideas to be
tested.
Future Internet Research and Experimentation
(FIRE) program in Europe is similarly looking at
future networks as a part of 7th Framework pro-
gram of the European Union (FP7). AKARI pro-
gram in JAPAN is also similar.
In addition to the above, Internet 3.0 is an in-
dustry funded program that takes a holistic view
of the present security, routing, and naming, prob-
lems rather than treating each of them in isolation.
Isolate clean slate solutions do not necessarily fit
together since their assumptions may not match.
Internet 3.0 while clean-slate is also looking at the
transition issues to insure that there will be a path
from today’s Internet to the next generation Inter-
net.
NSF has realized the need for a coherent architec-
ture to solve many related issues and has recently
announced a new program that will encourage com-
bining many separate solutions into complete archi-
tectural proposals.
It is to be seen whether the testbeds, which use
TCP/IP protocol stacks extensively, being devel-
oped today will be able to be used for future Inter-
net architectures which are yet to be developed.
In this paper, we have provided a brief descrip-
tion of numerous research projects and hope that
this will be a good starting point for those want-
ing to do future network research or just to keep
abreast of the latest developments.
11. List of Abbreviations
4D Data, Discovery, Dissemina-
tion and Decision
AKARI ”a small light in the dark
pointing to the future” in
Japanese
ANA Autonomic Network Architec-
ture
AS Autonomous System
ASRG Anti-Spam Research Group (of
IRTF)
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BGP Border Gateway protocol
CABO Concurrent Architectures are
Better than One
CCN Content Centric Networking
CDN Content Distribution Network
CONMan Complexity Oblivious Network
Management
CTS Clear-to-Send
DAN Disaster day After Networks
DFT Delay/Fault Tolerant
DNS Domain Name System









FIND Future Internet Design
FIRE Future Internet Research and
Experimentation
FP6 6th Framework Program
FP7 7th Framework Program
GENI Global Environment for Net-
work Innovations
GROH Greedy Routing on Hidden
Metrics
HIP Host Identity Protocol
HLP Hybrid Link State Path-Vector
Inter-Domain Routing
ID Identifier
IIAS Internet in a slice
INM In-Network Management
IP Internet Protocol
IRTF Internet Research Task Force
ISP Internet Service Provider
LISP Locator ID Separation Proto-
col
MILSA Mobility and Multihoming
supporting Identifier Locator
Split Architecture
NGI Next Generation Internet
NGN Next Generation Network
NSF National Science Foundation
OMF ORBIT cOntrol and Manage-
ment Framework
ORBIT Open-access Research Testbed
ORCA Open Resource Control Archi-
tecture
PANLAB Pan European Laboratory
PI Provider Independent
PIP Phoenix Interconnectivity Pro-
tocol
PLC PlanetLab Control
PONA Policy Oriented Networking
Architecture
PTP Phoenix Transport Protocol
RANGI Routing Architecture for Next
Generation Internet
RCP Routing Control Platform
RTS Ready-to-Send
SANE Security Architecture for Net-
worked Enterprises
SCN Selectively Connected Net-
working
SLA Service Level Agreement
SLA@SOI Service Economy with SLA-
aware Infrastructures
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Prototo-
col
SOA Service Oriented Architecture
SOA4ALL Service Oriented Architectures
for All
SPP Supercharged PlanetLab Plat-
form
TIED Trial Integration Environment
with DETER
UML User Mode Linux
WISEBED Wireless Sensor Network
Testbeds
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